Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎104r] (207/290)

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public demarcation of the boundary by a British Commission. It
was only suggested that he should agree either to meet Ibn Saud
himself or to depute a representative to meet a plenipotentiary from
Ihn Saud with the object of arriving at an agreement on all points at
issue between the two rulers. It was not anticipated that public
opinion would necessarily jump to the conclusion from the fact of
this meeting that the ownership of Khurma was being arbitrated
upon. It might not even be necessary for an arbiter to step in at all,
though it was suggested that an impartial British official should be
present in case the two parties failed to arrive at an agreement. He
must realise that if His Majesty’s Government were to present Ibn
Saud with another ultimatum, the result would be that the whole
militant power of the Akhwan would be let loose upon himself. It
appeared from the result of the recent conflict that he would be
unable to resist them, but would lose Mecca, and would retire into
obscurity under the greatest stain that could rest on the memory of
a Moslem ruler.
The political objections to the provision of British troops to
assist him was so great that he could not look for military support
from His Majesty’s Government. His army had been severely
defeated by Ibn Saud, and it was difficult to avoid the conclusion
that a similar result would follow from further hostilities. The
integritv of the Hejaz was as important to His Majesty’s
Government as it was to himself, but it was futile for them to act on
1 the assumption that he would be able to uphold by force of arms
any decision which was arrived at by His Majesty’s Government of
a nature to precipitate further conflict.
Ibn Saud had also demanded from His Majesty’s Government a
definite recognition of his various claims, and His Majesty’s
Government had declined to discuss them with him until he had
made a real effort to come to an agreement without their inter
vention. It was understood that Ibn Saud would be ready to come
to Jeddah and have a friendly conversation with Hussein on his own
territory, but His Majesty’s Government did not propose to suggest
this to him unless they were assured that in the event of
negotiations failing, both parties would accept the decision of an
impartial arbiter.
With regard to the ownership of Khurma and Turaba, His
Majesty’s Government had not receded from their previous attitude
that King Hussein had a right to restore order in Khurma. This
decision had been based on the evidence they had received, but in
view of the annihilation of his armies, and of the fact that Ibn Saud
was not prepared to accept this decision, His Majesty’s Government
earnestly hoped that he would consent as a matter of form to this
conclusion, among others, being eventually referred to a British
arbitrator in the event of an unsatisfactory conclusion to the inter
view between himself and Ibn Saud.
Colonel Wilson might also inform Hussein that His Majesty s
Government would be delighted to receive him in London some time
next year, but that they were anxious that before he came to
England the risk of hostilities between himself and Ibn Saud should
be entirely removed.
As to the questions asked by Ibn Sand’s delegation, he thought
that until the main issues had been decided it was unreasonable to
expect His Majesty’s Government to give definite answers on points
of detail. He was prepared to receive the delegation before they
left England, and he suggested that he should inform them of the
proposal which Colonel Wilson was to make to King Hussein, and
which would provide an answer to all his questions, except that of
the subsidy. With regard to the subsidy, he did not see that there
was any case for enhancing it, nor did he consider that His Majesty’s
Government were under any obligation to rehabilitate the territory
of Ibn Saud from the ruin caused by internal war, by Turkish
occupation, and by aggression on the part of Ibn Rashid. He was