Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎103v] (206/290)

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of a Boundary Commission. What was required was delimitation,
not demarcation of the boundary. Would it not be possible to bring
about a meeting, either between Hussein and Ibn Saud themselves,
or between plenipotentiaries of the two parties, either at Jeddah,
Aden, or Cairo ? The first thing to do was to get them to agree
without our interference if possible. If this attempt was unsuccessful
we could then ask them both to state their case before some
impartial officer of high rank, who need not necessarily be an expert.
Colonel Cornwallis suggested that, though it would be difficult
to get King Hussein to state the case about Khurma, for reasons
which had been pointed out by Colonel Wilson, it might make it
easier for him if we simply suggested that he should meet Ibn Saud
for the purpose of coming to a general agreement on the various
points which must necessarily arise between two coterminous States.
Mr. Philby thought that if King Hussein were induced to agree
that, in the event of a discussion between himself and Ibn Saud not
having a satisfactory result, the whole case should then be laid
before an impartial arbiter, Ibn Saud would have no objection to
meeting him at Jeddah.
Colonel Wilson said that there would be a better chance of the
two parties coming to an agreement if Hussein were represented by
Abdullah, who was more inclined to be reasonable. He did not
think that Hussein would agree to leave the Hejaz and meet Ibn
Saud at Aden or Cairo, but it was possible that he might come down
from Mecca to Jeddah to meet him. He thought it would be better
for Abdullah to meet Ibn Saud. He said that if the meeting took
place at Jeddah it would be necessary for Ibn Saud or his pleni
potentiary to be sent there by sea as neither could well travel
through the Hejaz.
Mr. Philby said that if Ibn Saud were to represent his own case
he would certainly expect Hussein to meet him personally, and
would not agree to meet Abdullah.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel said that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. had all along
been in favour of bringing the two parties together. He gathered
from certain of the papers that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. were regarded as
out-and-out supporters of Ibn Saud, and he wished to point out that
this was not so. What they were concerned about was that Ibn
Saud (whose case as stated in Mr. Philby’s report had rather
impressed them) should not be thrown over merely because that was
the most convenient course.
The Chairman said that it was clearly desirable to bring about
a meeting if possible. He suggested that Colonel Wilson on his
return to Jeddah should have a frank, face-to-face talk with
King Hussein somewhat on the following lines : He should start by
saying that he had just returned from London, where the whole
question had been discussed by His Majesty’s Government. The
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had himself taken a great
personal interest in the question, and was very anxious that he
should compose his differences with Ibn Saud. After examining
the arguments put forward on the King’s behalf by Colonel Wilson,
His Majesty’s Government were of opinion that King Hussein had
an excellent case. So excellent did this case appear that they
could not understand why His Majesty declined to state it himself
before some impartial arbiter to be appointed by His M^ajesty’s
Government. If it was the case, as Hussein contended, that his
ownership of Khurma and luraba was incontestable, there did not
appeal to be any valid objection to his producing the proofs which
would convince any arbiter at once of the justice of his claim.
He should realise that there was at present no question of the