Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎96v] (192/290)

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we should be accused of retaining that area because of itscommeif i<d
possibilities and its wealth of tobacco.
Replying to questions by the Chairman, he said that if the
Turks failed to carry out any obligation which might, be laid upon
them by the peace settlement to refrain from interference in t ie
Kurdish areas, the Kurds would be strong enough, with a htt e
encouragement, to keep them out of Eastern Kurdistan. 1 ne
Armenian question did not arise in Southern Kurdistan. 1 he
Suleimaniyeh tobacco was certainly very valuable ; he had heard
that 1,000,000Z. down had been offered for a tobacco concession in
that area, but he did not see why a British company should not be
able to exploit the w T ealth of the country even if it were not in
British occupation, provided His Majesty’s Government showed
themselves well disposed towards the desire of the Kurds to free
themselves from the Turks. He added that the Kurds were not.
fanatical Moslems, and he considered that the missionaries dream of
their eventual conversion to Christianity certainly rested on a
foundation of fact.
Agriculturally the mountains of Kurdistan did not present a
sound economic proposition. The establishment of stable conditions-
in Mesopotamia would produce a steady drain of the mountain
Kurdish cultivators to the plains as agriculturists, artisans, and
labourers, leaving in the hills a predominantly pastoral population.
These economic ties could be still further strengthened by
granting the Kurds a “ favourable tarif ” treaty.
The creation of groups of well-disposed communities to act as a
buffer between Mesopotamia and the Pan-Islamic movement which
was being so zealously fostered by the Turks in Asia Minor, would
be of great potential value, and everything should be done to reach
this goal by making a bid for the goodwill of the Kurds.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that the inclusion of the Suleimaniyeh
district in Mesopotamia was not a question which affected His
Majesty’s Government so much as it did the Arabs. He did not see
why we should take the richest part of Kurdistan and hand it over
to the Arab administration. Even if the lurks exploited the Kurds
in the future, the resources of the country would still find a natural
outlet into Mesopotamia, and a railway to Kirkuk would act as a
magnet for Kurdish trade.
General Coble replying to a question by the Ghairman, said he
understood that it would be quite possible to run a branch line up to
Kirkuk from a point on the river railway only 60 miles away, but it
would involve making a bridge over the ligris river some 600 to
800 feet span. The length of line from Kizil Rohat to Kirkuk w’as
nearly 200 miles.
Sir Henry Wilson said that the case for the policy of withdrawal
from Kurdistan appeared to depend upon the elimination of the
Turks and Germans from the Kurdish areas. It would undoubtedly
be a considerable relief from the point of view of the future garrison
in Mesopotamia. There was one point which he would like to
mention. This Conference was still a War Committee—he believed
the only one—w T hile the Treasury, on the other hand, had returned
to a peace basis. The result of this was that the decisions of the
Conference were sometimes objected to by the Treasury on the
ground that War Office expenditure was no longer dependent on
votes of credit, but had to conform to the Peace Budget. At the
same time, the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia was still on
active service, and naturally did not see why he should await
Treasury sanction for measures which he considered necessary from
a military point of view'. Though the war was over in London, it
was not over in Mesopotamia.