Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎96r] (191/290)

population an extreme reverence for the Badr Khan family. The
outstanding figure for the headship of Bhotan was Emin Ali Badr
K1 lan, whose sons had been well reported on by various British
ofhcers. He did not foresee any rival to him so long as the Bhotan
only wns in question, but he agreed that, if any attempt were made
to set up a larger Kurdistan, other claimants might dispute his
right to the title.
He said that the only pledges so far been given to the Kurds,
so far as he was aware, were that His Majesty’s Government did
not intend to pursue a vindictive policy against them ; that until
the political future of Kurdistan and Armenia came to be discussed
by the Peace Conference, it was impossible Tor His Majesty’s
Government to make them any promises ; but that th iy might be
confident that Kurdish national aspirations would not be lost sight
of by the Allied Powers when the time for discussion came. Non
committal as this declaration certainly v\as, it had proved sufficient
seriously to upset the Committee of Union and Progress.
Reverting to the murder of British officers, he said that he
could not speak for the last murder, but the two earlier incidents
had been clearly proved to be organised outrages inspired by
Haidar Beg and Mustapha Kernal. He had constantly come across
Turkish propaganda of the same nature in his own travels in
Western Kurdistan. The position was that the Kurds, while
friendly in general to His Majesty’s Government, were so gullible
that tliey could easily be worked up by Turkish propaganda to
commit anti-British excesses. It must not be forgotten that the
Christian Army of Revenge, wffiich had followed on the I iuil'ds^/of the^ h&zl
Russians into Howanduz, had committed just as horrible atrocities
on the innocent Kurds of that district as the Turks and Kurds in
other places had committed upon the Christians. It was only
necessary for the Turkish propagandist to represent the British as
the forerunners of a second Christian Armv of Revenue for the
Kurds to be worked up into a state of mind where he would
willingly murder a British officer.
General Cobbe said that, in his opinion, Suleimaniyeh should be
retained within the boundary of Mesopotamia. It had always been
administered from Baghdad, on which it wag economically dependent.
The trouble in the Suleimaniyeh district had been caused by the
personality of Sheikh Mahmoud, who had drawn false deductions
from the encouragement which had originally been given to him.
Other Kurdish leaders of the Suleimaniyeh area did not join Sheikh
Mahmoud, and there was no fear of their becoming a thorn in our
side. Even if we abandoned Kurdistan and took up the frontier
proposed by Major Noel, it would still be necessary to have a railway
as far as Kirkuk. The population of the western bank of the Tigris
was very thin, and the river alignment did not appear to offer any
commercial advantages. A garrison would always be necessary at
Kirkuk in view of the possibility of a raid from the mountains by the
Kurdish tribes. He thought that however far back the frontier were
drawn this possibility would always have to be reckoned with.
Sir Henry Wilson said that the Kifri-Kirkuk line was now
12 miles north of Kifri. He considered that if Major Noel’s proposal
were adopted, the Kifri-Kirkuk railway would be unnecessary.
Major Noel was trying to draw a line on racial grounds between the
Kurds and Arabs. Personally, he thought that the line should be
drawn wherever it led to the best likelihood of a peaceful solution. ,
British troops could live in Kifri and Kirkuk, which were no hotter
than Baghdad.
Major Noel considered that the best chance of a peaceful solution
was that the boundary should lie between the Kurds and Arabs.
He feared that if we were to remain in occupation of Suleimaniveh