Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎87v] (174/290)

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position in the mountains of Kurdistan analogous to that on the
north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India. It must be remembered that our
position in Mesopotamia would in all probability be quite different
from our position in India ; we actually possessed India and were
bound to protect it, but our function in Mesopotamia would be to
set up a native administration and start it on the right lines with a
view to some form of ultimate national independence. He was not
at all sure that this necessarily involved the Extension of our
responsibilities into the mountains, and he would be glad to be
satisfied on this point before proceeding further with the question
of the Kirkuk railway.
Mr. Montagu said that our first entry into the Kurdistan area
had been purely peaceful penetration by a few political officers.
A local rising had resulted in these officers being taken prisoner by
a Kurdish chieftain, and punitive measures had naturally followed.
He was not quite sure whether our original entry had been invited
by the Kurds or not, but he was inclined to think the position had
grown naturally, as it was liable to do when a settled administration
impinged on unsettled areas.
General Thwaites agreed that there had been constant fighting
and expeditions in this area, and considered that the inhabitants
had given us reason to assume that they were definitely antagonistic.
He pointed out that the Kirkuk route was the best line for a rail
way to Mosul, and would have commercial as well as strategic
advantages.
Mr. Montagu said that, so far as an approach to Mosul was
concerned, whatever railway line was eventually built to Mosul as
a commercial proposition would naturally be a charge on the
Mesopotamian administration. An alternative line along the river
was actually being proceeded with, and he did not think that the
commercial argument was sufficient reason for the Kirkuk line to
be undertaken at present.
Mr. Sfhuckburgh [said that the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad,
definitely regarded the Suleimaniyeh district as part and parcel of
Mesopotamia. He did not appear to consider the possibility of it
forming part of Kurdistan under any circumstances.
General Radcliffe observed that the history of the British
Empire showed how difficult it was for us to avoid extending our
responsibilities, however anxious we might be to do so. He
personally had little doubt that we should eventually have to
undertake the pacification of the mountains, as well as of the low
lying areas. Ihe point was whether the G.O.C., Mesopotamia,
should be ordered to cease work on the Kirkuk line or not. The
Quartermaster-General was somewhat apprehensive of Treasury
objections, and if it was to be stopped, it should be stopped as soon
as possible.
Mr. Bar stoic said that the I reasury view would certainlv be
that all expenditure should be avoided which could not be justified
by the strongest possible arguments. At the same time, he did not
think there would be any objection to the continuance of the
earth-work on the Kirkuk line for a week or two pending a final
decision of the policy to be adopted.
Mr. Montagu said that he preferred not to assume that we were
necessarily going to extend our responsibilities into the
Suleimaniyeh area. He suggested that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. should
telegraph to the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, pointing out to him
that troops could only be maintained in the Suleimaniyeh area if
this line were built, and that very strong arguments would have to
be brought forward to overcome Treasury objections. The Civil
Commissioner should be asked whether he really attached much