Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎87r] (173/290)

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[This Document it? the Property of His Bntannic Majesty’s Government.]
Printed for the Foreign Office. September 191.9.
SECRET.
[I.D.C.E., 28th Minutes.]
FOREIGN OFFICE.
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS.
Minutes of Meeting held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, August 20, 1919, at 7 p.m.
Present:
The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
(in the Chair).
The Right Hon. E. S. Montagu, M.P., Captain C. P. R. Coode, D.S.O., Director
Secretary of State for India, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . Operations Division (Foreign) Admiralty.
Mr. J. E. Shuokburgh, C.B., India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
^ Mr. G. L. Barstow, C.B., Treasury.
Major-General Sir P. P. de B. Radcliffe, j
K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Director of
Military Operations, War Office. Mr. Clark Kerr, Foreign Office.
Major-General Sir W. Thwattes, K.C.M.G.,
C.B., Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier-General Sir Gilbert Clayton,
War Office. ' K.B.E., C.M.G.
Major, H. W. Young, D.S.O. (Secretary).
The Chairman said that until Field-Marshal Allenby’s views on
the proposal to leave the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, to control
Kurdish affairs were received, and, in view of the rapidly changing
situation, he did not think it was possible for the Conference to
formulate a policy for His Majesty’s Government in the six Armenian
vilayets, but he wished to take this opportunity of bringing up a
point which had arisen at the informal discussion resulting from
the 26th Meeting on the subject of Mesopotamian Railways.
Mesopotamian Tlle Birector of Military Intelligence had not been at that
Railways. meeting, and it had been decided that as strategic considerations
were at the root of the whole question, these must be discussed
before the nature and scope of the recommendation to be made to
the Treasury could be decided. He now understood from General
Radcliffe that the immediate necessity for the Kirkuk line was to
provide a means of maintaining our hold over the Suleimaniyeh
area in the event of hostile action on the part of the local population.
This had come to him as a surprise, as he had been under the
impression that the Kurds in that district were supposed to be
friendly to His Majesty’s Government. Various suggestions had
been made as to the degree of control which we proposed to exercise
over them, and the best measures for preparing them for self-
government, but it had never been hinted that British control was
not eagerly desired by the Kurds themselves. It now appeared
that the Kirkuk line was necessitated by their hostile attitude, and
the question had naturally arisen in his mind why we were there at
all, and whether we were justified in embarking on an expensive
undertaking which appeared to be the first step towards creating a