Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎80r] (159/290)

3
tion that His Majesty’s Govermsot no longer considered the
Convention in force.
With regard to Persia, His Majesty’s Government had taken
the line that the Convention was in suspense, and would remain sn
until a Russian Government was established with sufficient authority
to abrogate it. He considered that it would be an unusual course to
take action in possible contravention of its terms, and then to
announce when questioned that it was no longer considered valid.
Mr. Max Muller pointed out that under Article 3 of the Peking
Convention of 1906, by which China recognised the Lhasa Convention
of 1904, the British Government undertook that all concessions for
telegraphs in Tibet should be denied to any State, or to the subject
of any State other than China. The Poreign Office view was that
the proposed presentation of wireless to the Tibetan Government
would, in effect, violate this undertaking.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel observed that Article 6 of the Tripartite
Convention of 1914 cancelled Article 3 of the Pekino- Convention of
c5
1906. In the Chinese proposals for a new agreement which was to
replace the Tripartite Convention, no mention was made of
concessions, and it appeared that we would no finger be held by any
previous undertakings in this respect.
Replying to a question by the Chairman, he said that the India
Office had consulted the Government of India on the question of
the suggested new agreement, and were now awaiting their reply.
The Chairman said that the proposal to present wireless
installations to the Tibetan Government was mainly actuated by
the fear that the Japanese would acquire control in a country
bordering on the frontier of India in which His Majestv’s Govern
ment must insist that their interests were predominant. He
reminded the Conference that the Japanese were our Allies, and
suggested that the first step to take was to approach them frankly on
these lines. They should bb told that His Majesty’s Government
were informed that they had concluded an agreement with the
Chinese Government, by which they acquired control in some
measure of telegraphs and wireless in China. He suggested that we
should put our cards on the table, and say that we should view with
disfavour any agreement which resulted in Japanese control of
telegraphs in Tibet. It was a recognised procedure that friendly
Powers should agree to recognise the interests of their Allies in parts
of the world with which they were most directly concerned. He
thought that the Japanese would be putting themselves in a very
awkward position if they attempted to evade a direct question as to
the nature of their agreement with China. He was inclined to think
that the Japanese difficulty would best be met by our adopting this
line.
With regard to China he would deprecate any attempt to
establish what virtually amounted to British control of wireless in
Tibet at the moment when negotiations were being conducted with
the Chinese Government with a view to their acceptance of the
agreement proposed by us in respect of Tibet.
The Conference decided—
(1.) That the Secretary of State for Poreign Affairs should
enquire from the Japanese Ambassador what was the
exact nature of the telegraphic agreement which the
Japanese Government had concluded with the Chinese
Government, and the extent of the concessions granted
to the Mitsui Company, and should intimate to him
that His Majesty’s Government could not view with
equanimity any attempt on the part of Japan to apply
its provisions to connection with Tibet.