Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎76r] (151/290)

.consider the whole frontier from Hanakir down to Itaina. It should
be clearly understood that if Ibn Saud was to be induced to wit !i-
draw his forces from Tarabah, Hussein should not be allowed
occupy the village during the armistice.
Captain Aylmer asked that the Rear-Admiral in the Red Sea
should be given discretion to take such necessary steps as deflecting
merchant shipping into Jeddah on the demand of the British agent.
He said that the Admiralty were anxious that this authority should
be given in view of the outcry which would almost certainly be
raised in the press and by Chambers of Commerce at what would be
described as an unwarrantable interfence with trade.
The Chairman agreed that this authority should be given,
though he sincerely hoped that matters would not come to such a
head that it would be necessary to evacuate British subjects from
Jeddah. He said that if it were decided to despatch Mr. Philby to
Ibn Saud he should go to Cairo en route, and be placed temporarily
under General Alien by’s orders for the purpose of his mission. He
must also see Colonel Wilson at Jeddah, and the latter should, in the
meantime, be instructed through General Allenby to endeavour to
obtain Hussein’s concurrence to the course proposed. He did not
think that we could accept Ibn Saud’s fresh claim that farabah was
also in dispute, and he thought that every effort should be made to
induce Ibn Saud to withdraw to Khurma.
The Conference decided —
1. That the Foreign Office should telegraph to General Allenby,
informing him of the decisions arrived at and instructing
him to take steps to convey them to Hussein and Ibn
Sand.
2. That the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. should repeat this telegram to the Civil
Commissioner, Baghdad, and inform him that it had been
decided that Mr. Philby should be placed temporarily
under General Allenby’s orders for the purposes of his
mission.
3. That the Rear-Admiral, Red Sea, should be authorised to use
his discretion on the steps to be taken at the request of
the British agent at Jeddah if it became necessary to
contemplate evacuation.
2. The Conference had before them telegram No. 15552 of the
17th May, 1919, from the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel said that it was necessary to give the Civil
Commissioner, Baghdad, some instructions regarding Ibn Rashid,
who had made overtures to His Majesty’s Government and was
waiting in the desert outside Basra for a reply. Colonel A. T. Wilson
had made certain proposals in his telegram No. 15552 of the l<th
May, but the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , in a letter to the Foreign Office of the
31st May, had held that, so far as Mesopotamia was concerned, there
was no reason for entering into any relations with Ibn Rashid at all,
arid that in any case such relations should be conducted from Cairo.
Sir A. Hirtzel questioned these views for four reasons: (1) Ibn
Rashid was our neighbour, and if our frontier was to be respected,
it was practically impossible not to have relations with him and
other desert chiefs similarly situated ; (2) Ibn Rashid controlled (
the pilgrim routes from Mesopotamia, and it was of considerable
local importance that they should be kept open; (3) if French
influence extended through the Syrian tribes down to Jaut, we
should require Ibn Rashid’s goodwill .to oppose a barrier to its
further extension ; (4) Ibn Rashid’s relations had, in fact, for
economic and other reasons, always been with Baghdad and not
Damascus.