Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎75v] (150/290)

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himself—with King Hussein’s concurrence—to visit Ibn Baud and
lay before him the views of His Majesty’s Government. He feared
that a meeting at which both chieftains would certainly be accom
panied by a large armed force would only result in further bloodshed.
He had always considered that Ibn Baud had a very good claim to
Khurma, but none to Tarabah, which was undoubtedly within the
Hejaz frontier. The real boundary should, in bis opinion, run from
Hanakir through Maran. and should pass 10 miles west of Khurma.
If it was understood that Ibn Baud should now be induced to with
draw behind this proposed frontier, the only place he would have to
evacuate would be Tarabah. He considered that it was urgent that
some steps should be taken without delay if the position was not to
develop to such an extent that military intervention on our part
would become necessary. He did not think that it would take him
more than a week to get to Jeddah if arrangements could be made
for him to proceed by air. He was not personally very friendly with
Hussein, who had resented his original journey past Tail to Jeddah,
and had suggested that he should return through Nejd instead.
Mr. Montagu thought that the proposal that Ibn Baud should
only be made to withdraw from Tarabah, and that he should be left
in occupation of Khurma, amounted in effect to acknowledging a
claim which His Majesty’s Government had hitherto not accepted—
that the possession of Khurma was a debatable point. He doubted
whether Hussein would allow Mr. Philby to be sent to Ibn Baud
with such a message as that proposed. He considered that it was
Hussein who should be approached rather than Ibn Baud, as it
was on Hussein’s part that concessions were demanded.
The Chairman pointed out that the proposal was only intended
to make Ibn Baud hold his hand until the arrival of a boundary
Commission. He did not deny that the policy which was now
being discussed amounted to a reversal of that hitherto adopted,
but m view of Ibn Baud’s strong position he did not see how it was
possible to adhere to the latter. He was quite prepared to consider
any suggestion on the original lines, but it must be remembered
that if Ibn Sand were to consider himself provoked in any way
he would continue his operations and attack and seize the Holy
Places.
Mr. Montagu did not see how King Hussein could be expected
to accept arbitration so long as Ibn Baud was actually in possession
of the disputed ground.
The Chairman agreed that Hussein had always been against
arbitration, but he did not think, in view of his dangerous position,
that it would be very difficult to make him change his point of view.
In reply to a suggestion by Miss Bell, that Hussein would possibly
abdicate again, he confessed that he contemplated his complete
disappearance, not only without apprehension, but even with
satisfaction.
General Radcliffe thought that Hussein must be badly
frightened; if he were confronted with the choice of being over
run by his enemy and giving safe-conduct to Mr. Philby, he thought
that there was little doubt that he would accept the latter
alternative.
Mr. Philhg, replying to questions by the Chairman, said that
adjudication of the boundary on the lines of tribal occupation would
not be difficult, but the real point was which suzerainty the tribes
concerned would accept. There was no question in his mind which
tribe ought to be in occupation of Tarabah, for example, but it was
(juite possible that if this tribe turned Wahabi and joined the
Akhwan movement it would elect for the suzerainty of Ibn Baud
rather than that of Hussein. He considered that the Commission
might suitably be despatched in September, and that it should