Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎46v] (92/290)

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General Cox admitted this was so, and said that if reduction
took place the role of the military would be quite different. Hitheito
it had been to keep open the road and pursue the Khans. With a
reduced force they could not be expected to do more than keep the
road open.
Mr. Oliphant said he was in favour of supporting Sir Percy
Cox’s proposals. At the last meeting two reasons had been put
forward for withdrawal, first—finance, and second—climatic effect
on health af the troops. Both General Douglas and Sir Percy Cox
were men who had had long experience of the Gulf, and were well
acquainted with the climatic conditions of that part of the world.
They knew what a summer in the Gulf meant, but they did not
appear to fear for the safety of the men. Nor, again, were they
novices in Eastern politics, and in view of their great local knowledge
their proposals were difficult to reject. It seemed to him that if
these two men were in favour of keeping our force there, then,
politically and departmentally, we ought to accept their advice ; and
if this policy was to achieve what Sir Percy Cox expected of it, it
would be worth the cost.
Mr. Waley said the point of view of the Treasury was that
while it was difficult to deny that we might lose control by with
drawing, we could not face the expenditure of, say, a million a year to
keep open this road indefinitely. Further, whatever happened, either
at the Peace Conference or in London, there seemed to be no prospect
of our getting out of Persia. It therefore looked as if this might
become a permanent charge.
I he Chairman said the quid pro quo we hoped for was not so
much the local advantage of an open road from Bushire as a final
arrangement with Persia. If the expenditure of three-quarters of a
million would be likely so to strengthen Sir Percy Cox’s hand as to
enable him to bring about that arrangement, would the Treasury
object to it ? He expected that the result of the Peace Conference
would be that Persia would come to u^. If a mandate were to
be given, nobody else was likely to accept the burden. If, on the
other hand, no mandate were given, the Persian delegates would still
come to us, provided we maintained our grasp over the political
situation, and the result would be the same. It would involve a
financial charge, but as a counter-poise we should manage Persian
finances, and the Ireasury would be much more secure than it had
ever been in the past. That was what we had in view, and he
thought there was a prospect of getting it.
Mr. Waley said if the expenditure was considered necessary in
order to achieve the solution indicated by the Chairman, the Treasury
would not be likely to object to it on financial grounds, but the point #
was how far the withdrawal was likely to affect the attainment
of this end.
. Mr. Oliphant said whenever withdrawal began there would be
repercussion in Teheran. Once Soulet had gone to Teheran the
situation would be easier, and when the Peace Conference was over
and the delegates had come to heel in London, we could at once
evacuate Southern Persia with less danger of complications.
General Bartholomew said when he had talked the question over
to-day with the Director of Militarv ()perations, they had been without
the advantage of the Chairman’s exposition of our general policy, and
the discussion had been on a purely military basis. There were no
military reasons for staying. As to a partial evacuation the War
< >ffice did not like the policy of small and scattered detachments
which involved the risk of disaster. They would prefer no force at
ail to be left in Southern Persia, but if one were necessary, it should
be a strong force. Of course, this view was subject to’ the large