Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎46r] (91/290)

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The Chairman said Mr. Shuckburgh's remarks were a fair
comment on the local situation in South Persia, but not, perhaps,
on the position taken as a whole. We must not overlook the fact
that the major situation must soon come to a head. In a recent
conversation with the Persian Minister, he had declined to receive
Musbaver so long, as the Persians were riding two horses, but had
intimated that as soon as the delegates realised that Paris was not
disposed to listen to them they would be welcome in London. The
Minister had gone to Paris to confer with his colleagues, and in the
course of the next few days we ought to know the result.
There remained the question of Soulet’s disposal, on which
Mr. Shuckburgh had not touched. There w r ere three proposals :—
(i.) To banish him ;
(ii.) To send him as a sort of State captive to Teheran, teach
him his lesson, and then reinstate him in (presumably) a
chastened mood;
(iii.) To leave Farman Farma to deal with him.
The difficulty of the last suggestion was that Farman Farma
himself showed signs of an inclination to disappear.
Mr. Shuckburgh said we could tell Soulet we considered he had
been sufficiently punished, and with a show of magnanimity make
with him the best bargain possible. To Farman Farma we could
hand over the South Persia Rifles, and continue the subsidy. It
was true the British officers wanted to leave the South Persia Rifles,
but even if they did the force should still have a good value as a
native levv. He admitted Ehtesham would have to go.
General Cox said Soulet had offered to go to Teheran. A
possible solution was to accept his offer and send him there before
we commenced the evacuation. There was still time.
The Chairman said the objection was that Soulet would very
soon find out. He would like, however, to consider whether, in the
event o^ total evacuation being thought undesirable, it would be
possible to hold the country during the hot weather with a smaller
force than that contemplated by General Douglas. Supposing, as a
soldi 3 r, General Cox was told that the Government wanted him
ultimately to withdraw, but that circumstances existed which made
it reasonable that the force should not disappear with too much
rapidity, could he keep a sufficiently firm hold on the country for a
few months with less than 3,500 men ?
General Cox said detachments would be required at four places :
Shiraz, Kazerun, Daliki, and Bushire. Provided they were immobile
in their posts less than 3,500 men should be sufficient to keep the
road open, but they could not move off the line or assume the
offensive. He pointed out that in Sir Percy Cox’s view any
reduction at all would loosen the grip he hoped to maintain on the
political situation.
General Bartholomew said the Chairman’s question was difficult
to answer definitely from a military point of view. Personally he
would not like to be faced with such a task, as it involved being shut
up in scattered posts without a central striking force. The best
defence was always attack, and the proposed position would be, if
not dangerous, at least intensely disagreeable.
The Chairman said that surely in the hot weather there would
be no one there to attack, for the tribes would have taken to the
hills.
Mr. Oliphant pointed out that in telegram .No. 1 99 Sir Percy Cox
had sipp'-ned the proposals of the G.O.C., Bushire, that is to
say, he was prepared to accept a considerable reduction.
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