Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎43v] (86/290)

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on the Holy Places than to prevent it. He felt consider
able hesitation about the wisdom of coupling to our message to
< bn Sand anything at all about the Ikhwan movement. If the
movement became aggressive later on we might have to declare
against it; but, so far, the evidence of aggressive intention did not
amount to much.
S;/ Reginald Wingate said that King Hussein was already
temiied of W ahabism, and regarded it as a menace, full of danger
to orthodox Islam. He himself thought that we could not afford to
dilly-dally with this movement, and he held strongly to the view
that it must be crushed. The Mullah was an example of the
unfortunate results that accrue from failure to take strong action at
the start m religious secessions of this sort in the East.
Mi. Siiuckburgh asked if ihe policv of crushing a religious
movement was not rather perilous.
Sir Reginald W mg ate said not at all. The security of the
oudan during the present war and its outstanding loyalty could be
aigely ascribed to our policy of putting down every unorthodox
movement as soon as it showed its head. He had seen manv
instances in which this had been done successfully, and felt he mus't
speak strongly After all, nobody knew his own people better
than Mohammed had done, and it had been Mohammed’s policv to
crush all heresy. 1
Mr Shuckburgh said, in view of the relations we had had with
Ibn baud and of our attempts to establish a friendship with him it
j Was a ,, e aw kward lor ue to turn round now and say “you are a
i . * y s ai d that he looked upon the unexpected agreement
between the rival \\ ilsons as a blessing. He felt that we might
with advantage follow the policy outlined in telegram Ko. 327.
The Chairman said it was difficult to resist such a combination
of authority as Cheetham, Clayton, Wilson, and Wingate Whether
their policy was right or not, they all agreed in deprecating the
comse advocated by this Conference (telegram No He InH
recommended it because he had not believed in the success of a
Boundary Commission, and because he had been convinced that the
question could only be solved by fighting. The probability seemed
to be that if we adopted the policy now proposed. Ibn Sand would
accept the reduction of his subsidy with disappointment, and wo d
ignore our request to leave Khurma, and therefore fighting would
still take place. On the other hand, he felt it would be mifiir
deprive him completely of Ins subsidy. It was probably vital to h s
toCnnn 7 m ° IlgSt S °,T Pe T? ,llat he sh0l > U have from 20,0001
to oO OOOZ. a year, and he would certainly be reluctant to lose it all
M ith regard to the question of how far Ibn Sand’s religious
prestige in the Wahabi world depended upon his retention of
Khurma, Mr. I hilby had pointed out that even the threat of the
complete uitlidrawal of the subsidy would not suffice to force Sand
to relinquish his claim. This lent weight to Sir Reginald Wingate’s
argument that Wahabism was, in its essence, aggressive Then
ultimately fight that ’ WhateV6r We dM ’ the Pa™es would
Mr. Shuckburgh said that, if this policy was to be adopted the
better course seemed to be, not to tell Ibn Sand he mifst leave
Khnrrnu, but to warn him that he must put no obstacle in the wav
of King Hussein s exerting his authority over the place The
asrar * w “ atsa?