Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎43r] (85/290)

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[987]—366 B 2
Wahabi movement in Central Arabia. The matter had become a
test case, and Ibn Sand could not afford to relinquish his claims.
In answer to a question by the Chairman, he said it was true
Khurma was a small isolated town separated by a large strip of
desert from the rest of Ibn Saud’s territories, and that until recently
it had been an independent outpost of Wahabism. But the reason
why it had come under Ibn Saud was because King Hussein had
interfered and endeavoured to introduce his own Cadi. Had Khurma
not been attacked by Hussein, it would have remained autonomous.
Sir Reginald Wingate said there ought not to be much difficulty
in effecting a reduction of Ibn Saud’s subsidy. A similar problem
had arisen in the case of Hussein, to whom we had pointed out that,
now the fighting was over, we could not be expected to continue
paying his full subsidy. Hussein had been quite willing to meet us
half way, and he thought that Ibn Saud would do the same He
thought our policy should be a liberal treatment of Ibn Saud,
provided he would leave Khurma to King Hussein. In the Aden
neighbourhood we subsidised most of the local chiefs.
Mr. Shuckburgh, in answer to a question by the Chairman, said
that, as far as he could recollect, we paid no subsidies to any other
Arab potentates on the Gulf side, except the Sultan of Muscat. The
payments to Muscat had arisen out of a special arrangement.
The Chairman said it seemed feasible to take as our basis the
policy suggested by Colonel A. T. Wilson in telegram No. 327,
and modify it on the lines suggested by Sir Reginald Wingate. We
might point out to Ibn Saud that the purpose for which the subsidy
had been granted had ceased to exist with the end of the war, and
that we could not continue to pay it in full, and we might add
that we could not tolerate the outbreak of hostilities over the
question of Khurma. If he withdrew from Khurma, he would
continue to receive a reduced subsidy. If not, we should be com
pelled to assist King Hussein. What attitude did Mr. Philby think
Ibn Saud would take towards such an offer ?
Mr. Philby said that, provided he were allowed to remain at
Khurma, Ibn Saud w^as unlikely to object to the reduction of his
subsidy. But if he was asked to leave Khurma he would certainly
disobey. As Imam of the Wahabis, he was bound to stand fast
and maintain his rights. He would argue that it w r as a religious
matter and that he had gone as far as it was possible for him to go
in offering to abide by the decision of a British Boundary Commis
sion. Ibn Saud knew' he was in the right, and, in view of the
religious element in the controversy, no offer of a subsidy would
induce him to relinquish that right.
Colonel Gribbon said that the War Office had always agreed
with the view advanced by Sir H. Wingate regarding the religious
nature of the Wahabi movement. So far as the subsidy was
regarded as payment for services rendered, there was no objection
to stopping it altogether. Except for a drawn battle with Rashid
at the end of 1914, Ibn Saud had not taken any active measures in
our support, and when we badly wanted him he did not help us.
But he thought that the wind might be tempered a little to the
shorn lamb, and, though he doubted if Ibn Saud had any real
control over Central Arabia, he was in favour of continuing payment
of a portion of the subsidy, subject to the conditions laid down by
Sir Reginald Wingate and the Chairman. He still thought that
some attempt might be made to turn Ibn Saud’s attention towards
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. rather than towards Central Arabia.
Mr. Shuckburgh said he sympathised with Mr. Philby’s views.
Our main object was to prevent the Holy Places from being over
run by the Wahabis. It seemed to him that the effect of the message
proposed by Colonel Wilson would be more likely to precipitate