Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎37v] (74/290)

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If we evacuate Trans-Caspia, the navy is essential to the safety of the army of the
Caucasus as protecting its right flank.
The army holding the valley south of the Caucasus range can only come into
conflict with the Bolshevist army to the north of that range by—
(a.) The pass of Dariel.
( 6 .) Through Petrovsk and along the sea coast.
(c.) By a Bolshevist landing to the south of Baku.
Of these (b), and particularly (c), are covered by the navy.
(b.) It would be impracticable for a military force to advance along the coast route
from Petrovsk to Baku without that force having coirpnand of the sea, as the whole of
that route is open to naval bombardment.
(c.) There is no doubt, after the utterances of Trotsky and Lenin to the effect that
their objective was Baku, that if the British Navy were withdrawn from the Caspian, a
force would be landed in the neighbourhood of Lenkoran or Astara and the barrier of
the mountain ranges would be turned, and our army would be compelled to fight in an
unfriendly country.
From the above it can be seen that so long as it is necessary for us to maintain an
army in the Caucasus, so long is it necessary for us to maintain a fleet on the ( aspian.
6 . The. Necessity of our holding Krasnovodsk.
As shown in paragraph 2 , the enemy forces include submarines.
So long as the enemy is confined to the northern part of the sea, so long are these
submarines innocuous. This for the reason that for about 100 miles south of Astrakhan
the water is too shallow for submarines to operate as such, and a submarine confined to
operating on the surface depreciates in value to that of a second-class torpedo-boat. If,
however, we were to evacuate Krasnovodsk, this fine port, only 150 miles from Baku,
would with its Bolshevist population become a submarine and naval base from which
operations could be conducted against us which would paralyse our naval forces. It is
considered that the possession of Krasnovodsk is essential to the efficiency of our naval
force, and that were we to evacuate it now we would probably have to recapture it in
the near future for our own self-preservation.
7. Considerations of Naval Strength.
Assuming that the crews of force (B) have been demobilised, it is probable that we
shall man the Caspian gunboats “Kars” and “ Ardagan,” either by demobilising some
of the less powerful of the ships we have manned already, or by sending additional
personnel from the Mediterranean fleet. this action alone will materially increase the
strength of our force, as these ships are quite the most powerful in this sea.
It is seen from paragraph 2 that the Bolshevist force is in numerical superiority to
the British. The question of moral figures so largely in comparing fighting forces that
it is considered this numerical superiority can be considerably discounted by the higher
moral and discipline of our force.
The position, however, cannot be regarded as entirely satisfactory, and may even
be considered disquieting.
The enemy has at his back the resources of the Baltic fleet, and with the opening
of the Volga to navigation in May it is expected that he will bring down considerable
reinforcements in the shape of torpedo-boats, submarines, guns, &c. To meet this
menace we can only send additional guns, air squadrons, and small motor-boats by
means of the Trans-Caucasus railway, and can take up and arm additional merchant-
ships. In this latter we are handicapped by the labour unrest and strikes in the
Caspian ports and dockyards.
8 . Probable Naval Activity during this Summer.
It is most desirable that every effort should be made to attack the Bolshevist fleet
at Astrakhan while that fleet is still immobile owing to the ice. For this reason
long-range bombing machines are required. With the machines at present available on
the spot (D.H. 9 ) Astrakhan cannot be reached from Petrovsk. It is therefore seen
that if it is required to bomb the Bolshevist fleet before the ice melts, it will be necessary
to establish a base further north than Petrovsk. This, however, cannot be done, since
the military policy is not to send troops further north of Petrovsk.