Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎37r] (73/290)

given on the 24th September to obtain possession of this fleet, either by bribery or
purchase, and if these methods failed the ships were to be captured or sunk. On the
26th October G.O.C.-in-C., Mesopotamia, was instructed that payment might be
guaranteed to the crews as from date of joining us, providing that a mouthy limit of
6 , 000,000 roubles was not exceeded. In view of representations from S.N.O., probably
influenced by G.O.C., North Persian Force, on the 29th October, the orders as. to
sinking of these ships were modified. The position, however, became steadily more
unsatisfactory as the crews became more and more infected with Bolshevist doctrines, until,
in consequence of a report that these ships were only waiting an opportunity to join the
enemy, orders were given on the 15th December toS.N.O. and G.O.C. that, if in any
way feasible, these ships were to be seized. By this time our military position was
less secure, and S.N.O. and G.O.C. both reported that owing to our military weakness
the operation was net feasible.
In consequence of representations from the Admiralty, the War Office on the
7th January, informed the G.O.C.-in-C., Constantinople, that the Admiralty wished to
effect this ccmp as soon as he was in sufficient strength, and S.1S.O. was informed
accordingly. Notwithstanding the fact that a considerable force of troops has arrived
at Baku, nothing apparently has been done to carry out these instructions, and on
the 26th January the Rear-Admiral Commanding Black Sea and ( aspian telegraphed :
“ The seven Russian ships .... are so much infected with Bolshevism as to be a
potential danger At my request, Denikin has directed General Firdley, now
at Batum, to proceed to Baku and order Bicharakov to pay them off.
G.O.C.-in-C., Constantinople, reports that General Erdley lelt Batum on the
9th February. .
On the 3 rd February, S.N.O. reports that he anticipates a strike which will
probably develop into an anti-British movement, in which Russian flotilla would side
against us.”
Bicharakov appealed to the crews of this squadron on the 20 th January, m the
local press, to put aside the spirit of unrest, The time for such appeals is past ;
the situation is too serious for us to wait to see if it should have any effect.
If General Erdley produces no result, it will be necessary to act immediately
against this fleet, as this menace must be removed before the ice at Astrakhan melts
and liberates the Bolshevist fleet. This is_ obvious, as seen from paragraph 2 , which
shows the immense numerical superiority which would be possessed by the enemy were
forces (B) and [C) permitted to join. At the moment, force (C) is frozen in, and
consequently the opportunity must not be missed for rendering force (B) harmless.
Orders have been sent to the C.-in-C. that, if General Erdley produces no result, the
ships are to be captured or sunk. The G.O.C.-in-C. has been informed of this order by
the War Office, and directed to render assistance. It is considered that this order will
considerably strengthen General Erdley’s hand.
Between Forces (71) and (0).
It is recognised in naval warfare that an offensive policy is the best to follow.
The Senior Naval Officer is rightly taking every opportunity to harass and destroy
the Bolshevist fleet.
Between Forces (B) and (C).
There is no doubt that a considerable percentage of the crews of the Russian
flotilla would welcome joining the Bolshevists, particularly those who have relatives in
regions occupied by the Bolshevists, as they are under threat that, if they fail to join,
punishment will be meted out to their relatives. It has been argued that they will not
join the Bolshevists because many of the men have their homes in Baku. This
argument is not considered worth much, as the men know we will not take revenge on
their families.
5 . The Duties of the Navy.
While we hold Trans-Caspia, the navy is a part of the British line extending from
Batum to Merv. Its duties are :—
( 1 .) To maintain the line of communication between Baku and Krasnovodsk ;
( 2 .) To maintain the line of communication between Baku and Enzeli;
( 3 .) To prevent enemy raids on the Caspian shipping and coast towns.