Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎34v] (68/290)

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3 . Disputes between the Georgians and their neighbours are bound to arise oyer
historical boundaries. Vast tracts of land were originally owned by the Georgian
aristocracy. These people in many cases found that Armenian and Mussulman labour
was cheaper and more industrious than their own people ; large tracts of land,
therefore, gradually became populated with Armenians and Mussulmans. Added to
which, tribes were continually invading the country ; and, further, alter the conquest of
the Caucasus, the Russian Government did everything to encourage colonisation by the
Armenians and Tartar tribes. The Georgian aristocracy, who are a pleasure-seeking
and lazy people, later fell into debt to these colonists, and mortgaged or sold them
their lands. Consequently large tracts of historic Georgia are now actually populated
with a preponderance of Armenians or Tartars and in many cases these people actually
hold the lands. The Georgians now claim that these historic lands should be included
in their territories, while the Armenians or Tartars, fearing the advanced socialism and
nationalisation of lands by the Georgians, claim the right of the majority to settle their
destinies, and are willing to fight for their lands.
4 . That all property on Georgian territory belongs to the Georgian Republic is a
source of endless dispute between the Georgians and the Russians, the latter
maintaining that railways and institutions built up entirely on Russian money cannot
be considered as the property of Georgia. The same applies to the large quantity of
military stores and material supplied for the Russian armies on the Caucasian front, and
at present in the hands of Georgia.
5 . That the Georgian Government is aide to maintain order within its boundaries
seems to be more or less correct, and, compared with the rest of Russia, order exists.
German troops have done much to establish this, although they never seem to have
been used except for the moral effect of their presence. The Government maintain
that the social reforms and nationalisation of the land did much to establish order and
check Bolshevist propaganda. The German troops were under contract to support the
Government, or risk an infringement of the contract, which meant the loss of trade
concessions to Germany. The reactionary element is very weak in Georgia, and led by
an indolent aristocracy.
The Prime Minister (M. Jordani) and the Minister for foreign Affairs are
undoubtedly the soundest elements in the Government, fhe}^ are both former
members of the old Russian Duma, men of enlightenment and high education, and
more democratic than socialist. They are, however, almost entirely in the hands
of the ultra-socialistic elements, which are led by Cheidzi and Ramishwilli, with
Tseritilli in the background. Open support of Jordani and Gegechkori, with a fixed
policy and a strong guiding hand on the part of the Allies, would probably have
the effect of establishing a feeling of strength and confidence among the followers
of the democratic element, and enable Messrs. Jordani, Gegechkori, and Co.
to check the extreme socialistic left party. Even the most violent Monarchists
are rightly of .the opinion that a change of Government at the present time might
lead to fatal results and place the country entirely in the hands of the ultra-socialists,
and even, perhaps, the Bolshevists. It seems an established fact that certain members
of the Parliament, if not actually members of the Government, have been flirting with
the Bolshevists Vladikavkas, and many of the infantry regiments are ready at any
moment to throw in their lot with the Bolshevists. One of the reasons of this is the
close proximity of Denikin and his army. The Socialists openly state that, rather
than run the risk of conquest by Denikin and a Russian Monarchy, they would rather
hand over the country to the Bolshevists.
Anti-Russian Feeling .—This is most extraordinarily strongly marked in all parties.
On the one hand are the Russian Bolshevists’ pretensions to Georgia, and, on the
other, Denikin and his Monarchists, and the fact that every Russian looks upon the
Caucasus as a part of the Russian Empire. Russians are badly treated, and looked
upon with great suspicion.
Anti-British Feeling .—There is a feeling of distrust towards us more than dislike.
Every Socialist naturally distrusts the British, and looks upon us as Imperialists. They
cannot imagine that we have not come to stay in one form or another. I he Georgian
Nationalist cannot fathom our policy, and states that he cannot understand a policy
which presumably aims at supporting the claims'of small people, among whom Georgia
should be included, yet, at the same time, supports Denikin, his volunteer army, the
Czecho-Slavs, the Ufa Government, Kolchak, all of whom have the main object of
re-establishing a Russian empire within her former boundaries.
Armenian Question. —The whole of this question is far too complicated and
involved to be dealt with in this report. As far as concerns the limits of this report.