Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎26v] (52/290)

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Secondly, we had had in view the necessity of keeping order
in Batum and Baku, of helping the nascent States that were
struggling towards the establishment of their national indepen
dence, and of preventing the spread of Bolshevism. Thirdly, we
had had to maintain the naval control of the Caspian and to keep
up connection with Trans-Caspia. Our operations, undertaken
for these purposes, had, however, attained a magnitude far greater
than had ever been contemplated or authorised, and the reports
under discussion shewed a state of affairs that had surprised every
member of the Conference. We now found that though, broadly
speaking, our policy had been to prevent these States from flying
at one another’s throats and to encourage them in establishing
their independence, in practice, we had set up Governments, or
at any rate military Governorships, in all these States, and instead
of being looked upon as benefactors and friends, we appeared to
be generally unpopular and to be regarded with grave suspicion
throughout the Caucasus.
The situation was so intricate that perhaps it might be as
well to summarise the state of affairs in each district. Going from
west to east we found:—
1. Batum and its neighbourhood were an area by themselves.
The inhabitants were for the most Adjarians, who were intensely
hostile to the Georgians. The upshot of our intervention here was
that at present there was a British Governor and three battalions
in Batum, and our evacuation of the place would entail instant
warfare between the Georgians (who considered they had a right
to the city and its environment) and the local inhabitants, who
regarded them with the greatest dislike.
2. A little further east in Kars there was also a Government
under a British soldier, with an administrative council. The
remarkable feature of this district was that it was essentially
Armenian, but the Armenians had been turned out, and had not,
up to date, been able to return. There was, however, no doubt that
they must come back in time, probably in the spring, when their
crops must be sown. We w T ere bolstering up a minority in the
State. Here again, therefore, there was a reversal of the proper
conditions, and trouble might be expected.
3. Russian Armenia had a mixed population of Georgians,
Tartars, and Armenians, all at each other’s throats. Once more
we found the phenomenon of a British military Governor at
Nakchivan, whose presence was the only guarantee for such govern
ment as existed and for the maintenance of order. Whether or
not it was desirable that this district should form part of a larger
Armenia was a question which would be decided elsewhere. The
feature we had to.consider was that it was only our presence there
that prevented a state of civil war.
4. Georgia was a State with a historical past. At present it
boasted an embryonic Government and a Ministry containing
some men of considerable ability. Their policy was strongly
socialistic, as was seen by their scheme of land nationalisation,
which in those parts of the world meant taking the land of the
people whom you did not like. Georgia had been buttressed in
the early days by the Germans, and it was still bv no means free
from German influence. The Georgians were kept from fighting
the Armenians only by our presence. They had grave suspicions
orf us because of our relations with Denikin, whom they regarded
as the representative of the Russian monarchical ideab and there
fore their bitterest enemy. Our support of Denikin had, of course,
been given for altogether different reasons, namely, in order to
assist him in keeping back the tide of Bolshevism—but it was clear
that there was something behind the fears of the Georgians. There
seemed little doubt that Denikin intended to crush Georgia and
in spite of our prohibition, he had passed the line laid down by
us both on the west near Sochi and also further^ east in