Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎26r] (51/290)

[987]—809 B
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majestys Government.,
Printed for the Foreign Office. March 1919.
SECRET.
[I.D.C.E., 11th Minutes.]
FOREIGN OFFICE.
•
INTER DEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS.
Minutes of a Conference held at the Foreign Ojfice on Thursday, March 6, 1919,
at 10'MO a.m.
Present :
The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.L, G.C.I.E.
(in the Chair).
The Right Hon. Winston Churchill, I Mr. J. E. Shuckburgh, C.B., India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
M.P., Secretary of State for War, War I
Office.
Admiral Sir Sydney R. Fremantle,
K.C.B., M.V.O., Deputy Chief of Naval
Staff, Admiralty.
Captain C. P. R. Coode, Director, Opera
tions Division (Foreign), Admiralty.
Major-General P. P. de B. Radcliffe,
Director of Military Operations, War
Office.
Mr. E. H. Jones (Secretary).
Mr. G. J. Kidston, Foreign Office.
Mr. J. V. Simpson, Foreign Office.
Mr. S. D. Waley, Treasury.
Policy in the The Conference had before them a Report from General G. F.
Caucasus, including Milne, Constantinople, dated the 6th February, 1919, a Memo-
Naral Policy in randum by the Admiralty (undated), a Memorandum by the
e aspian Foreign Office, dated the 5th March, 1919, and a Report by Major
McDonnel (Tiflis), of the 27th January, 1919.
The Chairman said that the present position in the Caucasus
was more confused than any with which the Eastern Committee
had had to deal during the last year and a half. The Government
and the Prime Minister were anxious to reduce our military com
mitments in the Caucasus, and to release the troops there at the
earliest possible moment for three reasons: First, it was a secondary
theatre of operations; second, the cost was already enormous; and
third, fresh sums would have to be asked for and a case made out
in the House of Commons. The explanation required was not an
easy one to convey to the public, and it might be difficult to con
vince the House of Commons of the necessity for this expenditure.
Our commitments in the Caucasus had grown insensibly and
without the knowledge of the Eastern Committee. Our policy
itself had been consistent throughout.
We had gone there originally for the purpose of driving out
the Germans and the Turks, and of enforcing the terms of the
Armistice. This portion of our aim was complete, or very nearly
. . complete.