Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎25r] (49/290)

5
consequences. We could perhaps afford to risk an outbreak For a
little longer in the hope that when our position in regard to Arabia
generally was clearer we should be better able to deal with the
question of appointing a Commission.
General Thwaites said he supported Sir Reginald Wingate’s
views that the parties must be allowed to fight it out. It would be
some time before the message of “ hands off ” could reach the
opposing forces; besides, if there were to be fighting, it might be
possible to get Feisal to take his troops out there to help his father,
and thus get his attention off Paris.
General Cox said that, from the military point of view, the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. were in favour of Mr. Shuckburgh’s solution. It seemed
to him that our decision could be put off until the Peace Conference
had issued its mandate on Arabia. King Hussein would then see
that we were to be there permanently, and would be more amenable
tq our offer of a Commission.
The Chairman said he did not understand that there was any
prospect of Great Britain receiving a mandate for the whole of
Arabia. We did already enjoy, and we hoped to continue to
maintain, a predominant influence there, but he doubted if the Peace
Conference would place us in any better position to put pressure on
Hussein than we were in now.
Sir Reginald Wingate said that perhaps Hogarth’s suggestion
contained in telegram No. 252 of 17th February otlered a solution,
giving the touch of delay that seemed to be required.
The Chairman said the part of the telegram referred to read as
follows :—
“Hogarth is-decidedly of opinion that now Medina and
Asir are both evacuated, and no more danger of Ibn Sand
receiving rapid Turkish support, the time has come to compel
the latter to check Akhwan’s movement towards the west. He
thinks he will feel financial pressure most, and suggests
immediate notification to Ibn Saud of suspension of his subsidy
until satisfactory evidence has reached us that Khurma, which
we regard as in the dominions of the King, has returned to the
latter jurisdiction and Akhwan’s aggression in and towards the
Hejaz has ceased. If he complies, arrears of subsidy would be
paid up. If he fails to comply, further action with denunciation
of our treaty and blockade of the gulf ports could be
threatened.”
This was far from being the policy which Sir Reginald Wingate
had just advocated, and seemed to involve a change of attitude. He
himself did not see why we should threaten Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud
had done what he thought he was entitled to do, and he had
understood that so long as the Holy Cities were not threatened
Sir Reginald Wingate’s view had been that we should not interfere.
Mr. Philby asked what would be done if Ibn Saud attacked the
Hejaz or Mecca.
The Chairman said that we would help Hussein if it came to
the point, not with troops, but with guns, rifles, and money ; but we
should have to define the conditions under which we would come to
his military assistance. Our interests were only concerned when
the Hejaz on this side of the desert was entered. Our position was
that, if they chose to fight about Khurma, and in and about
Khurma, they might do so without interference from us. But if
Ibn Saud carried the fighting farther into what we regarded as the
Hejaz proper, then we would step in. Since Hussein would not
arbitrate he might fight it out if he liked.
Our policy seemed to be to say to both sides that we deprecated
fighting, and would like to see it avoided. We had already