Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎24v] (48/290)

The Chairman said the question seemed to him to be when was
the right moment for a Commission to be appointed ; but, if he
recollected aright, Hussein had already refused to accept this
solution.
Mr. Shuckhurgh said that his recollection was that on one
occasion during the war there had been a definite refusal by Hussein.
Sir Reginald Wingate said undoubtedly Hussein had refused,
and he thought he would refuse again. His attitude was that he
wanted nothing whatsoever to do with Ibn' Saud. Ibn Saud was a
heretic, and, as a true Moslem, he could not enter into negotiations
with him. Heresy must be blotted out, not bargained with.
So long as Hussein held these views any attempt to make peace
must fail.
The Chairman asked if the Conference thought we ought to
wait for the rival Wilsons to meet at Cairo, as it had been proposed *
they should do, on the 26th February, or come to a decision here.
Sir Reginald Wingate said he thought that the matter should
be decided here.
J he ( hairman said m that case there seemed to be three courses
open. I he fiist was to say “ Hands off* on both sides j there must be
no fighting ; these raids^ must be ’stopped ; ” and to threaten the
withdrawal of subsidies if this advice was not taken. At the same
• time we could assure the Sherif that we would not allow the Holy
I lac One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand rupees es to be attacked, and tell Ibn Saud that, when the war was
over, we would demarcate his boundary. The second possible line
was to continue saying “ Fight if you want to,” with the old proviso
about the Hol\ j laces. I he third was to have a Commission at
once. He himself was not in favour of an immediate Commission
because he objected to having our hands forced in this way, and
because he saw in it no immediate prospect of success.
Sir Reginald Wingate said that he did not think delay was
piacticable. Ibn Saud was within reach of Taif and some decision
vas necessary at once. At present King Hussein was absolutely
loyal, but, if we interfered by ordering him to refrain from attacking,
Hussein would always have the excuse for complaining that we had
held him back. We might have every confidence that, if he did
attack, he would make short work of Ibn Saud. Now that Medina
had fallen the Sherif was in a stronger position than ever, and our
proper policy seemed to be to allow him to crush this Wahabism as
had been done once before.
Mr. Philby said that Ibn Saud had remained inactive because
he knew he was in the right and relied on the strength of his case
before a British Commission. He was convinced that, if we promised
to send a Commission out, Ibn Saud would not take action If on
the other hand, we decided to let them fight, it should not’ be
forgotten that there was always the danger of a strong raid on -
Mecca, which would be disastrous. The fighting qualities of the
men of Nejd were not to be despised. Provided we were quite
confident that Hussein would be victorious, it might be advisable'TO
let them settle the matter in their own way, but it must not be
forgotten that Ibn Saud would counter-attack, nor would he be
deterred by the fear of losing the sympathy of Islam, for he regarded
himself as Islam s true representative. He had 30,000 to 50 000
men, and if they once got into Mecca they could loot it. He himself
was strongly m favour of a Boundary Commission being appointed
now to settle this local dispute.
Mr. Shuckburgh said that on the whole the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. were in
favour of the first course suggested by the Chairman. If this were
adopted, at the worst there might be fighting, but, as the Chairman
had pointed out, Arab fighting usually leads to little or no serious