Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎23v] (46/290)

boundary between Nejd and the Hejaz. Mr. Philby. held the view
that Khurma was part of Nejd, and had informed us that this
trouble had arisen because at one sta^e King Hussein had put a
Cadi of his own into Khurma. Hussein s contention, on the other
hand, had been that Khurma "was really Sherifian, and belonged
to the Hejaz, and that Wahabism was an aggressive heresy and
threatened the Holy Cities.
Sir Reginald Wingate said that he considered the Chairman s
remarks were a fair and correct summing up of the situation as he
knew it. He wished to emphasise the fact that King Hussein was
seriously concerned from a religious point of view’, for he regarded
Wahabism as a heresy that was threatening all orthodox Islam, and
he genuinely dreaded a movement of this sort. Jbn Saud, from
the King’s point of view, might be regarded as a Mahdi. He was
the Imam of Wahabism, and it certainly seemed to be the case
that the moral code of the Wahabis was lower than that of ordinary
Islam.
Mr. Philby disagreed, and said that, from what he knew of
the W^ahabis, he was inclined to the view that they were the most
moral of all Mahommedans.
Sir Reginald Wingate said that the quarrel over the possession
of Khurma w r as of very old standing. Whether or not it should be
regarded as a Hejaz dependency was difficult, but Hussein claimed
that Bijad’s entry into the village had been an act of aggression, and
maintained that the political paramoun/cy over Khurma certainly
belonged to the Hejaz. He himself was inclined to agree with
Hussein on this point.
Mr. Philby, in reply to a question of the Chairman as to who
received the revenues of Khurma, said that in the davs of the
Wahabi invasion of Hejaz, Saud the Great had been in possession of
Khurma, and had remitted in perpetuity the taxes of the place. In
consequence, for the last 100 years no taxes had been paid, nor had
the question of the political suzerainty of Ibn Saud or the Sherif over
the village ever been raised in a definite form before the war.
Khurma itself was a comparatively unimportant village, the onlv
oasis in the desert, situated about five days’ march from Mecca; or,
roughly, about 100 miles as the crow flies, Khurma being the capital
and only oasis of the territory of the Sabai tribe. The real question
in dispute was whether the boundary should lie 10 miles west of
Khurma or 120 miles east of Khurma, i.e., whether the Sabai
territory belongs to Hejaz or Nejd. He considered that King Hussein
claimed Khurma as a test case for the possession of the whole
surrounding desert.
Sir Reginald Wingate said that there was one point in the
Chairman’s opening remarks from which he was inclined to differ.
The Chairman had rather questioned the genuineness of King
Hussein’s threat to abdicate. In his own opinion, Hussein was
honest in this threat. He was certainly loyal—more loyal, if all that
had been said was true, than Ibn Saud.
With regard to the question as to whether we should interfere
or allow the parties to fight it out, he had formerly raised objections
to letting them fight. At that time Medina had not fallen, but now
the situation was different, and he thought w’e should allow them to
settle the matter by force of arms, because it seemed most unlikely
that we should have any quiet until they had settled the matter in
their own way.
The (hairman said that Feisal had asked for tanks, and had
been talking in a most bloodthirsty manner about his intention to
go and wipe out Ibn Saud. Did Sir Reginald Wingate think that
Hussein was likely to win if the matter did come to fi«ditin<>- 2