Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎23r] (45/290)

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
Printed for the Foreign Office. March 1919.
SECRET.
[I.D.C.E., 10th Minutes.]
FOREIGN OFFICE.
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CONFERENCE ON MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS.
Minutes of Meeting held at the Foreign Office on Monday, February 24, 1919, at 5 p.m.
Present:
The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.
(in the Chair).
Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., High Commissioner
for Egypt.
Mr. H. S. T. B. Philby.
Mr. J. E. Shuckburgh, C.B., India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
Lieutenant-General Sir H. Y. Cox, K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., C.S.I., Military Secretary,
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
Major-General W. Thwaites, C.B.,
Director of Military Intelligence, War
Office.
Mr. G. J. Kidston, Foreign Office.
Mr. E. H. Jones (Secretary).
The Situation in The Chairman said that the quarrel between King Hussein and
Khurma. ]j m Saud over the possession of Khurma had often engaged the
attention of the Eastern Committee in the past, and it was fortunate,
now that it had once more become acute, that we had present
representatives of both sides (if he might call them such) to give the
Conference the benefit of knowledge obtained on the* spot. The
last meeting at which the question had arisen was that held on the
14th January ; Medina had then just fallen, and we thought that
Ibn Saud would not be likely to prove aggressive. Accordingly we
had decided not to interfere in the quarrel. In fact, we had
always held the view that, if the two parties really meant fighting,
then, sooner or later, they would do so, and, on the whole, there was
a good deal to be said in favour of let ting them settle the matter by
force of arms. We had been the| more ready to adopt this view,
because, as acquaintance with the East had often proved, it was
never wise to pay too much attention to mere threats of fighting,
as Eastern fighting, when it did take place, did not usually involve
bloodshed on a large scale. The combatants confined their activities
for the most part to firing in the air, galloping about, and making
as much noise as they possibly could. Sustained battles between
large forces rarely, if ever, took place.
Our decision, therefore, had been to the effect that, for the
moment, we did not consider interference necessary. At the same
time, the cardinal feature of our policy was that, if it did come to
the point, we were bound to stand behind Hussein.
The question had now become acute again. 'Ibn Saud was in
Khurma and looked aggressive. Hussein, thinking perhaps as much
of his subsidy as of his quarrel, had once more delivered his familial
threat of abdication.
It should be borne in mind that w^e have alw T ays promised that
when the war came to an end we would, if desired, demarcate the