'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎73v] (151/386)

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11. On the same date, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed to the Marquis of
Assurance given to the Sheikh. La “ sdoWne ^ tl'e Sheikh’s agent had
again pressed hard that we should give a
secret written assurance that, so long as the Sheikh and his Arabs followed our
advice, we should prohibit a further curtailment of their rights. Sir A. Hardino-e
was in favour of giving some such intimation, both to the Persians and to the
Arabs, at the start of the Kusso-Belgian Customs regime at Mohammerah, as
the best security against any attempts to cajole or bully the Sheikh into accept
ing a veiled Russian Protectorate.
12. Finally, an assurance was given to the Sheikh, which was communicated
by Sir A. Uardinge to the Government of India on 4th December 1902. After
recapitulating the enquiries made by the Sheikh's agent as to our readiness to
protect him against the only danger he really feared, viz., an attempt by
the ships of a Foreign Power, either at war with, or acting as the pretended
friend of, Persia, to depose him and deprive the Arabs of their ancient rights,
Sir A. Hardinge’s letter to the Sheikh went on to inform him that 3 the
Foreign Minister of the British Government had authorised the British Minister
to say that we should protect Mohammerah against naval attack bv a
Foreign Power, whatever pretext for such attack might be alleged ; and, also,
that so long as he remained faithful to the Shah and acted in accordance with
our advice, we would continue to give him our good offices and support.
13. The full scope of this promise and the reasons which had led to its
being given were verbally explained to the Grand Vizier by Sir A. Hardinge on
1st December 1902, in a manner w hich left no room for misunderstanding 3 The
Grand Vizier endeavoured to argue that our interests were not affected by any
changes in the position of the Sheikh, who was a local Governor like any‘other.
To this the British Minister replied that there was no wish to call in question
the Shah’s sovereignty over the Chief or people of Mohammerah, but our
experience in Seistan had been a lesson in the effects which a Russian Consul
and Belgian Customs officials could produce on our interests at the resid
ence of a remote and ill-informed Persian Governor. On the Karun, as in
Seistan, the Russians had no hona fide commercial interests and their recent
appointment of a Consul could have only political objects. Me were deter
mined not to have, if we could help it, another Seistan in Mohammerah, and
we intended therefore to let Sheikh Khazal understand that, if Russian agents
attempted to intimidate him, or insinuate that they could bring pressure to bear on
him owing to the influence which they exercised'at Tehran, we on our side were
ready to support him. It was because threats of this kind had been used by Prince
Dabija, Russian Consul at Ispahan, when he visited Mohammerah, that Sir A.
Hardinge had felt obliged to intimate to the Sheikh that our naval forces in
the Gulf were more powerful than those of Russia, and that they might be
employed in certain eventualities for the purpose of maintaining the status quo
in which he and we were alike interested.
14. A note respecting the customs and status of the Sheikh of Moliam-
merah was aiso addressed, by Rord Lansdowne’s directions, in Januarv 1903,
to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, which was acknowledged by the latter in friendly
term>, but this wiitten communication did not inform the Persian Government
how. far we were prepared to support the Sheikh by force of arms in certain
contingencies. 15
15. On lOtb December 1903, Sir A. Hardinge telegraphed to the Foreign
Sheikh complains of evasion of agree- Office and to the Viceroy that the
Mohammerah question was again likely
to become acute. The Sheikh complained that the Persian Government were
endeavouring to evade the agreement made in 1902, and, in contravention of
it, attempting to impose duties on him and to introduce additional Bel
gian Customs officials and generally to undermine his authority. He wanted
to know definitely if we would support him in resisting these ‘ encroachments,
if necessary, by forbidding the Persian Government to emplov force against
him, should he on his part repudiate the arrangements unless the Persians
Kept to them. Sir A. Hardinge was personally in favour of our doing so, and