Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎268r] (535/544)

in Sir Hamilton Grant’s Paper. That Paper, he submitted, included
all the Chairman’s points, except that it did not insist on a British
M.litary Commander. Otherwise the difference lay in the manner
in which the points were to he put to the Persian Government, and
Mr. Montagu hoped that the conciliatory manner would be given a
trial first.
Sir Hamilton Grant said the Persians were suspicious of us, and
with reason. All the Indian Government wanted was to break down
that wall of suspicion which the A iglo-Russian Convention had
generated. The Indian Government felt that the minatory policy
adopted hitherto had been a failure, and they wanted to give the
“ velvet glove ” a chance. The only difference between Lord Curzon
and the Government of* India appeared to be in regard to the manner
of’our communications to the Persian Government—not the substance.
The Committee were generally in favour of the policy recom
mended by the Chair man and Lord Robert Cecil.
Persian Policy :
.Finance.
Levies.
South Persia
itities.
5. The Committee had under consideration a note by
Mr. J. M. Keynes (E.C.--871) on the cost of our existing policy in
Persia. Tne note showed that our aggregate expenditure in that
country was now at the rate of 80,000,000L sterling per annum, and
there was no sign of earl v diminution. This sum was for expenditure l
in Persian currency, and was excl isive of the cost of military stores
brought into the country or of the British forces. About 2,800,000Z.
monthly of the above v\as to be classed as military expenditure,
chiefly 1,500,000L for N.»rth-West Persia, 290,000L for Bushire,
290,00 l l. for the South Persia Rifles, and 140,000i. for the Seistan
levy. The note concluded by suggesting that this expenditure
seemed out of all proportion to the objects attained and would be
difficult to defend in Parliament.
Mr. Keynes said that he had one qualification to make to his
note, which was that the military expenditure was ba^ed on actuals
up to date, and that the basis ot the 6,000,000 tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. referred to in
the analysis of expenditure appended to his note was retrospective.
He would also point out that the exchange was so unfavourable that
the actual was not far snort of double what it would have been with
the pre-war exchange.
The C airman said that he had been taken aback by Mr. Keynes’
note. In his opinion every possible eff >rt should be made to cut
down this excessive expenditure at once. He thought it was
desirable to know what was tne present situation as regards the
various levies that had been raised.
The Committee decided to instruct the War Office—
(a.) To inform the General Officer Commander in Chief, Meso
potamia, that military expenditure must be confined to the
ti'oops necessary for holding the Bagdad-Caspian line,
and that all other ventures should be closed down.
(b.) To ascertain for the Committees information what activities
of a military character were being maintained other than
those necessary for the protection of the said line.
The Chairman furl her suggested that the moment was opportune
to re luce our expenditure on the bouth Persia Rifles.
The Committee decided—
To instruct the Foreign Office to ask Sir P. Cox to state the
earliest moment at which, in his opinion, the South Persia
Rijies could be handed over, and our other commitments
shut down.
Mr. Oliphant referred to a telegram from Sir P. Cox, dated 20th
December, No. 1058 (E. C. 2918), communicating a statement
C
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