Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎267v] (534/544)

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extremes of abandonment and a more definite and resolute
policy. All who knew the Persians well had opposed this
solution, viz., tSir Charles Marling, Sir P. Cox, &c. A third
suggestion was that we should contemplate at this stage
acting as the mandatory Power for Persia at the Peace Con
ference. It was not, however, yet certain whether there were to be
mandatories, and no invitation to act in this capacity might be
issued for some months to come. He doubted it any Power would
accept this responsibility, directly it realised what pecuniary burdens
were involved. 1 he only lines on which he himself thought we
could at the moment proceed weie as follows: Certain Persian
delegates were now coming to Europe. We ourselves were not
aware of their views, nor did we perceive any necessity for their
attending the Conference. The Conference itself would probably
not desire their presence, hut supposing they were admitted they
would, he thought, soon find their own level, as the Conference
would not want to he bothered with their woes, and would probably
turn to us as the only Power willing to make the necessary pecuniary
sacrifice for Persia. In any event Persia’s case might not he taken for
months. The interval, he suggested, might be utilised in discussing
the whole case with the deleg ites with the utmost frankness, which
need not be necessarily or immediately minatory. We should say to
them “ You have to settle your future with us. We have already
told you that we are prepared to meet you on certain points, (a) we
will renew our definite assurances that your integrity and indepen
dence will be preserved, (6) we are prepared to abrogate the Anglo-
Russian Convention of 1907 in whatever form may be most suitable,
(c) we would welcome the establishment of a regular national Persian
force, ot which the first commanding officer should be British, though
other nationals might be employed below him, (d) similarly, as
regards finance, in view of the fact that Great Britain is the pay
master ot Persia, the chief financial adviser at the head of a common
body, which might be recruited from different nationalities, should
also be British, (e) we are anxious to take away our troops both in
the north and south of your country directly Persia is secure from
invasion on the north, and the roads of communication are secure in
the south.” If the delegates refused to meet us on these lines we
might then say : ‘‘ This is our policy; if you are unable to fall in
with it we cannot continue onr present huge subventions, we must
call in our debts and must leave you to bankruptcy and ruin. If, on
the other hand, you agree, we will continue our present support on a
modified scale.” We were anxious to be friendly. But in the last
resort the Persians should realise that the iron hand lay beneath the
velvet glove.
Lord Robert Cecil said that at one time he had inclined to the
view that, so far, the situation in Pers n had not benefited bv our
presence, and he had b‘ en disposed to favour the policy of letting her
“ stew in her own juice.” He had now, however, arrived at the
same conclusion as the Chairman, and he had been led to this by the
danger of JStarosselski becoming Dictator. He had, however, one
proposal to make. The delegates would probably have no influence
in their own country. \\ e should, theretore, simultaneously
communicaie our terms to Vossugh and other influential men in
Persia. He himself thought that Persia would accept the British
Commander and financial Adviser. If however, they refused our
position would be d mgerous as Starosselski would come forward as
the saviour of Persia. We ought, therefore, to think out what our
policy would be in this event, that is to say if, in the last resort,
Persia refused all our offers.
(At this stage Lord R. Cecil left the Meeting),
Sir A. Hirtzel said that the view of Mr. Montagu, who was
unable to be present at the meeting, was generally that put forward