Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎252r] (503/544)

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of time. Her own shores would be separated from those of Constantinople,
and as the War Ofiice' ::: ' has pointed out, in any struggle in the future those
responsible for her existence would have of necessity the very onerous responsibility
of defending the shores of Greece in different parts of the Mediterannean that are
particularly difficult to protect. 1 think that we shall all agree, for other reasons as
well, that I need not enter into here that Greece cannot be considered. No other
small Power is worthy of a moment’s attention.
Our next question is, Can it be a great European Power ? Here we can proceed
just as quickly by the method of exhaustion. Russia has forfeited her claim, and
had disappeared from the scene. As to France and Italy, neither would agree for a
moment to the appointment of the other ; nor should we, I imagine, agree to either
ourselves. I think that they must be wiped off' the slate. I hope that the Committee
do not think that I am dealing in a dogmatic or arbitrary way with this problem.
I am merely trying by the brevity of my conclusions to save time. One could argue
the case of Russia, or France, or Italy for ten minutes each.
The remaining great Power which is possible is Great Britain. I dare say that
most of us, at the bottom of our hearts, think that Great Britain is the best qualified
for the task, and could undertake it with the greatest advantage to the people
themselves. A telegram came in only yesterday from Constantinople indicating that
offers of that sort are not unlikely to be made to us by the Turks themselves. But I
assume that we should agree that it is absolutely out of the question that we, with our
vast burden, should—even if we were invited to do so either by the Turks themselves
or by the League of Nations—assume the further responsibility of the future of
Constantinople. If any opinions are entertained to the contrary, we could perfectly
well argue it at this table ; but I do not argue it now, because I assume it to be out
of the question.
The smaller Bowers and the greater Powers having thus been hypothetically
eliminated, there remain two or three other alternatives.
One is that of a condominium, the policy that whenever mentioned is only
mentioned to be rejected, but that sometimes has to be adopted as a pis-aller because no
other can be found. International boards do exist for the control of the navigation of
the Danube and other rivers. They have been tried in other parts of the world. The other
day when we were talking about the Caucasus, as we explored the different possibilities of
military occupation—British, French, and otherwise—it was Lord Robert Cecil, I think,
who said : “ Well, after all, we may have to come back to the idea of an international
force,” which we had all rejected. Therefore I suppose that it is not impossible, perhaps
it is not unlikely, that in the case of Constantinople, if every Power—great or small—
is rejected one after the other, some kind of international constitution may have to be
set up in order to rule as well as it could (I am afraid that it would be very badly) the
city and the adjacent areas. But I feel that it is quite unnecessary to explore that
solution, because it is one, I imagine, to which the Powers would only be driven in the
last resort.
The last suggestion is America, and from the evidence that has been put
before us here we know, first, that America has been, through her missions and
otherwise, warmly interested m Constantinople for a long time; and, secondly, that
there exists a strong party in Constantinople, 1 believe the C.U.P. and their
followers, who, largely for reasons of a selfish nature, are anxious to bring America
in and make her the mandatory Power. 1 should say in passing that 1 think that
they are much more concerned in doing that in order to save their own skins and
to preserve the simulacrum of Turkish rule and authority in Europe than they
are from any regard either for the interests of their own populations or from any
sympathy with reform in the future. But let that pass. There is or there may be
a decided movement to bring the Americans in. Whether America would accept
the responsibility I do not know. In all our discussions during the past few weeks
we have been proceeding upon the hypothesis that, having done so much to promote
the scheme of a League of Nations, America will be almost bound, in honour as well
as in logic, to take her share in bearing the responsibility. Whether that will carry
her so far as to assume an obligation of this sort is a question on which 1 have always
had very grave doubt myself, but which no doubt we shall see resolved in the
course of the next few weeks. I do not therefore attempt to discuss the question
whether America would be likely to accept the charge if it were offered to her.
An entirely different point is raised by the attitude of our naval authorities
here, who think that the position of the Americans in any important post
* E.C.-2824.
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