Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎243v] (486/544)

bis friends from Persia and the policy he is fully disposed to adopt in advising them
when they come here. He frankly admitted all the premises to which I have referred.
He said, ,k My country is in an absolutely hopeless condition. She is on the verge of
complete chaos. When you go she will fall into irretrievable ruin. She has to be saved
from that. Who is to do it? In my judgment, lie said, “you are the best
able to do it.’’ I said, “It is the last thing that we want to do. We want
to curtail and not to magnify our responsibilities there, besides which we are aware
that you do not want us to do it. I do not think that you will find any British
Government anxious to do it, unless it is the express wish of the Government and the
people of Persia. What do your people want ? ” He said, “ When they come over
here, my impression is ihat tney will speedily realise, and if they do not realise, then
they ought to he told, the essential facts and truth of the case, which,” he said, “ I
know as well as you do, and which I am prepared to put before them. What the
Per bans really want at this moment are these things : First, that your forces should
remain, at any rate, for the. time being, because they are the only thing that stand
between us and absolute ruin ; secondly, that you should maintain your cordon up
the eastern side of Persia, and should continue in strong occupation of Meshed. W e
do not want disorder to spread across that frontier any more than you do, neither do we
want a reflex influence from Afghanistan to invade Persia. Thirdly, I hope you will
remain in the Caspian. The Persian Government would rather fly their flag in the
Gasp an, but whatever happens in that respect, I hope that you will not withdraw
yours, because we realise thoroughly the danger to us from an open frontier on the
north. Fourthly,” he said, “ I hope that if the Persian Government comes to you
with a request to maintain its position, you will, in the reorganisation of the Persian
army after the war, allow Belgian rather than British officers to be employed. Ihat is
the main thing we want tnem to have. We think that it would be desirable to have
a neutral State. ‘ We $re ready to take any neutral State you like. Belgium seems
to be the one most favoured, and we hope, therefore, that you will consider Belgium.”
Lastly, he put in the otiier plea, which the Foreign Office is familiar with, for some
Persian share in the control of the Holy Places of Mesopotamia, Nejef and Keibela.
That has figured from time to time in discussions here, and as far as I remember,
it is a suggestion that has always been refused or at any rate, unfavourably regarded
bv our Foreign Office for reasons which I need not now enter into. “Broadly
speaking,” he said, “those are the lines on which I am going to work with our
representatives. Do not be alarmed at their saying that they want to raise this
and that at the P^ace Conference Those are not the real issues. They want to give
a chance to Persia. In my judgment, that is the only way in which the chance can be
given.”
There are two small questions to which I will allude in closing, because I want the
opinion of Sir Charles Muling upon them. Supposing that some such policy is
pursued, one question is the attitude to be taken up towards the Russians who still
remain in the country, and particularly to the Cossack division. We have passed
through various phases as regaids this. In the days of the Anglo-Russian agreement
we supported the Russians because we were under a treaty obligation to do so. A little
later on we supported the Russians because we feared that if we did not the Germuns might
come in from the north and take their place. Now we are supporting, or have sup
ported the Russians because we are afraid not of the German, or of the lurk, but of
the Bolshevik. We keep the Russians going because if they faded, worse spirits would
enter into their place. This revolves round the question of the Cossack division. I
have alw r ays understood it was a brigade.
MR. OLIPHANT : It became a division.
SIR CHARLES MARLING : It is 6,000.
LORD CURZON : It is nominally 11,000, and actually 6,000. This is a force
wh cu, in the reign of financial profligacy which I have been describing, we have been
financing for some time past, the oflh ers of which are on friendly terms with us but
wh<> are, after all, always Poking after Russian interests and not British interests. I
understand that Starosseiski has a purely political concepuon of his duties, and ne and
his'Cossacks are really the Praetorian Guard to the Shah, and the Shah looks to them
for t e security of his position.
Suppose that we retire altogether from the scene, Starosseiski and his men are left
as the '<)le military force, an i he becomes dictator. He is just as much the ictator as
the man in Constantinople in the old dnys, who was the head of the Praetorian Guard,
and put emperors on and off the throne as he desired.