Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎243r] (485/544)

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somebody, some Power, some force behind her. Who is it to be ? A little earlier the
Persians themselves had great hopes of America. America showed a very benign
and friendly interest in them, sending missions and spending large sums of money and
indeed conducting a mild flirtation. Undoubtedly the Persian nationalists seem, from
the days when they employed Shuster, to have contemplated a day when America might
come definitely to their assistance. I do not know what the policy of America is, hut
1 do know that from all that we learn of the views of President Wilson it is extremely
unlikely that his Government would he willing to undertake any considerable
responsibilities in Persia. They may be compelled to take them elsewhere. I am more
sceptical about that than many of my friends. That they will undertake them in
Persia I am unable to believe. I am confirmed in that belief by reports that have
come to us in the reports of Judson’s mission.
LORI) ROBERT CECIL : I do not think that we need argue that.
LORD CURZON : I will say no more about it. Neither need I say anything
more about France. It is certain that her responsibilities are already too great for
her to undertake further burdens in Persia.
On this point the Government of India, who have throughout been anxious to
adopt a friendly and conciliatory policy, make the proposal that we should continue to
give Persia arms, money, financial advisers, &c., that we should give her in fact a chance
of standing on her own legs, and, observing as much reticence as we can, but giving her
material assistance, leave her to fight her own battles. In theory that is a very sound
policy, but in practice it does network. It is what we have been trying to do for years
without the slightest result. We have only to read the reply ot Sir Percy Cox to see
that plausible as such a theory is, it must almost inevitably break down in practice.
If that be so, we are then driven to consider either the selection of some neutral State,
or of curselves in combination with a neutral State. There seems in the papers to be a
general agreement that among the neutral States Belgium is the best fitted, or peihaps
I should rather put it the least unfitted, for the task. One knows well what it means
putting a small neutral State in charge of that kind of job. In the first place they
have nob the traditions nor the experience ; they do not understand what the govern
ment of Orientals is. Efficiency is not the ideal with them that it is with us, and their
tendency is to embark upon a policy of intrigue. Sir Charles Marling and others know
pretty well what our experience has been of that sort of thing, and though the circum
stances of the war have perhaps put the Belgians into different relations to ourselves,
and though it may be necessary to fall back upon their assistance, I should not myself, in
the interests of Persia, regard Persia in charge of the Belgians as justifying any great
hopes for the future regeneration of that country. I see in the papers that Belgium is
put first among the possible candidates and Norway second. l hat Norway can have
any experience of this sort of thing is absolutely out of the question. Her loyalty
may be unquestioned, but I should have thought that her capacity was a very doubtful
factor.
Now we come to Great Britain. Our stake is the greatest, our knowledge of
these parts of the world by far the most profound ; our experience extends over a much
longer period of time. We are the people naturally and inevitably to do this thing.
Buf then comes the question. Can we do it? Can we undertake all these responsi
bilities ? Can we find the staffs—the men ? Shall we and the Indian Empire be able
to stand the strain, or will it be too great for us ? Those who are impressed with these
views seem to favour the idea of what I have described as a joint mandate Great
Britain standing in the background as the purse-holder and the general dictator of
policy and the neutral State, Belgium or another, managing the administration of the
country. I do not know whether that particular experiment has ever been tried—the
big country in the background, whose interests are predominant, and a smaller country
through its officials* managing its affairs, relying at every stage on the financial and
moral support of the bio 1 Power, and endeavouring to act with loyalty both to the
country and the Government they serve and to the big Power standing in the back
ground. I should have thought that it was rather a perilous experiment.
My argument seems to be leading to an impasse, but at this stage I take my
parable from what was said to me only last week by the former Regent ot Persia, the
Nasr-ul-Mulk, now resident in this country, who is in close touch with and personally
known to the Envoys coming over here. He came to see me, and 1 think he has been
to the Foreign Office too. He probably talked to me with greater frankness than to
almost anybody else, because we were at college together, and have been intimate
friends ever since. He came to talk to me about the line that was likely to be taken by