Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎190r] (379/544)

[365—40]
E.C. 2443.
G
19
on the Suez Canal named Kantara. From there the line runs, and there can be little
doubt that in the future for movement by sea Kantara and not Jaffa or any other place
will become the commercial port of Palestine. Secondly, I ask the Committee to
consider the strategical point of view. Has not the whole history of the w;ir shown
us—I hesitate to speak upon it because it is a strategical point—that Palestine is
really the strategical buffer of Egypt, and that the Canal, which is the weak side of
Egvpt, if it has to be defended in the future, will have to be defended—ns it has been
in this war—from the Palestine side? We were tempted into Palestine by our
position upon the Canal and by the threat of a Turkish invasion that inevitably drew
us forward upon the Canal, drew us across the Sinai Peninsula, and involved us in
Palestine itself. Therefore, from the strategical point of view there is a close community
of interest between Palestine and Egypt. Another consideration is this. Ought we
not to try and keep the Arabs of Palestine in close touch with the Arabs of the country
both to the east and to the north? If you, so to speak, segregate them under the
charge of a separate Power which has no interest in those regions, you will really
sterilize them and arrest their growth. On the other hand, our position and influence in
the surrounding Arab areas must be always so great that the Arabs of Palestine would
have, I think, a much better chance in our hands than in those of any others.
The final consideration is this, that, from all the evidence we have so far, the
Arabs and Zionists in Palestine want us. The evidence on that point seems to be
conclusive. Our most recent telegrafns include two, in one of which the Zionists
propose to General Clayton that Great Britain should assume a permanent tutelage
over Palestine until both the Jews and the Arabs decide otherwise by decisive
majorities. General Clayton, in his telegram* of the 1st November, proposed a form of
declaration as follows : “ That it is desirable at an early date to issue a declaration to
the effect that the tutelage of Palestine shall continue until both Jews and Arabs in
Palestine agree mutually that it should cease. Agreement w~ould necessitate a majority
of both Jews and Arabs respectively in favour of complete autonomy, and tutelage
would continue if either party refused to agree.’’ General Allenby ngrees that a
declaration in the above sense would have a good efiect, provided it came from the
Entente Powers. Obviously it is impossible that any such declaration should come from
us. It might come at a later date from the Conference. The point I wish to put
before the Committee is this, that when we go into the Conference we should for our
part drop altogether the idea of international management of Palestine in the future,
that we should make the best arrangement we can for its boundaries, and then, if it
becomes a question of America and ourselves, believing in our own mind that it is best
for the interests of the people of both parties that we and not America should be the
Power, we should give every encouragement to this view I have put forward, namely,
that under the principle of self-determination both the Zionists and the Arabs should
be left to speak for themselves.
LORD ROBERT CECIL : Yes. I have verv little to say. As far as our agree
ments are concerned, I do not read the Sykes-Picot Agreement myself as compelling us
to advocate an international administration—I forget the exact phrase—but 1 think any
administration under international control or direction would be met by
LORD CLTRZON : It is rather stronger than that. In the brown area “ there
shall be established an international administration.”
LORD ROBERT CECIL : The form of which is to be decided by
LORD CURZON : The other allies and the representatives of the Sherif.
LOUD ROBERT CECIL : That leaves the thing at large, and an international
administration may mean anything, provided it is one internationally agreed upon. I
think we are not in any difficulty about the agreements. As for the proper thing, I do
not think there can be the least doubt that, from the point of view of the inhabitants,
we should almost certainly do it better than anybody else, and therefore it would be
better for us to do it. The French are entirely out of the question, for the reasons
given by Lord Curzon, and also because the Italians would really burst if you suggested
it—and the Greeks too. Therefore there is no question at all of the French, and it is
entirely a question of the Americans or the British. I should be glad to see the British
there. At the same time I should not like to rule out the Americans. There are
advantages in having the Americans there. Upon the strategical aspect I do not