Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎158v] (316/544)

4. Our general conclusions are that for the time being we should continue to
support the Trans-Caspian Government. We should, however, make it clear to them
that our support, which is necessary to them to maintain their position, is contingent:—•
Firstly, on their undertaking to reorganise and control their forces to the
satisfaction of our representative. Their chiefs must be disabused of the views they
now appear to hold that we can be relied on to do all the lighting for them, as was
evident from the conduct of their troops reported in the series of telegrams to which
your attention was drawn in my No. 14196, dated the 28th October.
Secondly, on their acceptance of the military measures which our military repre
sentatives may consider necessary.
Thirdly, on the cessation’ of barbarous methods by which they have treated their
military and political prisoners.
Fourthly, equitable and proper treatment of Turcomans. Monetary assistance
could not altogether be withheld from this Government, but their officials must be
made to understand that we are not prepared to spend money, except on projects which
would have [? been] approved and passed by our representative [? and then on results].
We should also give them military support to the extent possible in their arrangements
to prevent a Bolshevik advance west of Kaakha to keep the Turcomans in order, and to
maintain communications between Meshed and Krasnovodsk. We would make it clear
that on no account are our troops to engage in enterprises east of Kaakha, without
express orders which would depend on His Majesty’s Government’s instructions in
paragraph 3.
Further, in view of importance of support from local Persian authorities in
Khorasan, we should take all possible steps to keep the Governor-General on our side.
APPENDIX III.
E.C.-2373.
From Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, Army Department, November 15, 1918.
(Military. Secret.)
Clear the line.
3035. Your telegram No. 14977, dated 6th ; 15090, dated 9th ; and 15251, dated
13th November.
It is not policy of His Majesty’s Government to embark on anti-Bolshevik
campaign in Russia, but considerations both of honour and of interest demand that he
should keep Bolshevism from regions east of Black Sea. Our object is to help
Russians to stand by themselves, and we shoidd therefore do everything possible to
support and strengthen existing organisations which offer hope of maintaining law and
order and are working in our interests. Our support would consist ordinarily of
warlike material and financial aid, and our troops must not be committed to fresh
enterprises which might place them in difficult situations. The above applies to the
Askabad Government. It is evidently impossible for Malleson’s troops to protect that
Government by remaining in Askabad. Therefore he may be authorised to occupy
Merv as long as, in his opinion, the military situation necessitates it, but British or
Indian troops should not be employed east or south of Merv. This does not apply to
Russians and local hires. Malleson should be instructed to use every means in his
power to prevent hostilities between Askabad Government and Turcomans. In the
light of the above, it may be necessary to reconsider your orders not to reinforce
Malleson, the reasons for which I await.
It does not appear desirable, in view of his record, that Bicharakoff should cross
into Trans-Caspia, but, if this becomes unavoidable, conditions under which he does so
must be settled by you.