Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎158r] (315/544)

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The Czechs on the Ural front are reported to be retiring, and if they evacuate
Orenburg, which seems likely, direct railway communication will be open between
Moscow and the Afghan frontier. In that case it will be necessary to reinforce General
Malleson if he is to hold his own against the Bolsheviks. On the 10th October the
Government of India telegraphed : “we are considering the possibility of
sending him (Malleson) now another Indian cavalry regiment, which would bring Ids
total force on the railway and at Krasnovodsk, when troops under orders from Force
< l) , all reach him, up to 6 squadrons of Indian cavalry, 1 battalion British infantry,
6 sections machine-gun company, 1 battery R.I.A., 500 riiles of 19th Punjabis, and
50 selected levies. It might be possible to send him another Indian battalion if
necessary.”
The surrender of the Turks has made it possible for General Marshall to spare
any troops required in Trans-Caspia, and ihese could be despatched and maintained
via Enzeli and Krasnovodsk, provided we control the Caspian.
Conclusion.
It is considered that the Government of India’s telegram of the 23rd October still
holds good, and that General Malleson’s Mission should be maintained, and, if neces
sary, reinforced, in order to protect the N.E. Persian border from incursions by
Germans, Bolsheviks, and other lawless elements. It is hoped that there will be no
relaxation of our efforts to control the Caspian, and the Trans-Caspian Railway from
that sea to the Afghan border, until order is finally restored in Trans-Caspia. Any
reinforcements required by General Malleson should be despatched from N.W. Persia
via Enzeli and Krasnovodsk.
November 1, 1918.
From Viceroy, Army Department, to Secretary of State for India, October 23, 1918.
(Military. Secret.) [Received October 25, 4'3<) p m.]
14347. 23rd October. Your telegram of 17th instant. The financial position is
being dealt with separately.
Our appreciation of the situation in Trans-Caspia is as follows :—
1. Main object of Malleson’s Mission was to counter possibility of Turco-German
thrust towards Afghanistan. In execution of this policy, Malleson has committed
himself more or less to an unstable party of Menshevics, calling themselves the
Turkestan Union or Trans-Caspian Government, and has, as a result, come into direct
conflict with the Bolsheviks.
2. The change in the military situation, so far as can be foreseen, very materially
reduces the menace to India as a consequence of an advance by Turco-German forces
from the Caucasus. There remain, however, the following considerations :—
(a.) The necessity for a close watch on political movements in Trans-Caspia and
Turkestan, more especially in reference to their possible influence on
Afghanistan and the frontier tribes.
(6.) The importance to us of the establishment of a Government favourable to our
interests, and to which we can lend support.
(c.) From recent orders of War Cabinet, we presume that His Majesty’s Govern
ment still desire control over Caspian; for this the retention of Krasnovodsk
is necessary, and the maintenance of communication with Meshed desirable.
For these purposes, Malleson’s Mission is still required with a sufficient
military backing to retain on our side such local elements as can best
forward these objects. At the present moment the Trans-Caspian Govern
ment, although thoroughly untrustworthy, represent only body with whom
we can deal.
3. His Majesty’s Government have not indicated that they desire co-operation by
the Trans-Caspian Government with other Allied movements against Bolsheviks
generally. Gnless this is required, Malleson’s support to the Trans-Caspian Govern
ment should be limited to the objects outlined in paragraph 2. In any case, difficulty
of communications with Meshed and shortage of transport make it impossible for us
to despatch any considerable force from India to assist.