Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎150r] (299/544)

5
C
[365—36]
Political Service in
the Middle East.
The Committee decided ;— •
That the Admiralty should send the following telegram to the
Senior Naval Officer, Baghdad, the contents of which should
be communicated by the War Office to the G.O.C.-in-C.,
Mesopotamia :—
“ In view of the change of circumstances the orders
contained in A.T.-1458 of the 2Mh September are modified
as follows :—
“Our object now is to retain such control of the Caspian
Sea as to enable us —
“ (1) to prevent any communication by water with hostile
object between its shores.
“ (2) to assist any forces friendly to us.
“ No armed ships should be sunk unless they show hostile
opposition to this policy, and no merchant ships should be
captured unless they are in your opinion acting in interests
contrary to ours.
“ If G.O.C. Mesopotamia has no decided objection, ships
armed and manned by us should fly white ensign.
“ War Office are informing G.O.C. Mesopotamia of this
change in Admiralty policy.”
4. The Committee had before them a Memorandum by the
War Office (E.0.-2042) and a note by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. (E.C.-2079)
regarding the formation of a Political Service in the Middle East.
Lord Robert Cecil stated that it was very desirable that the
whole of the Middle East, Egypt, and Mesopotamia inclusive, should
be under one control. Such control should, in his view, be centred in
a separate Department of the Imperial Administration, which should
be neither the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. nor the Foreign Office, but would be in
close touch with both Departments. He had now formed a separate
Middle Eastern Department in the Foreign Office, which Depart
ment could eventually be transferred from the Foreign Office to the
new Department. For the moment, so many of the questions in the
Middle East had an international bearing, such as French claims in
Svria and North Mesopotamia, that it was necessary, for the time
being, to retain the Foreign Office control. He hoped, however,
that at an early date it would be possible to develop the
Middle Eastern Department at the Foreign Office into a
joint concern with the Middle Eastern Section of the India
Office. We were now approaching a definite stage when the purely
military administration of occupied enemy territory would have to be
replaced by a civil administration, and it was most important to
secure unity of control in civilian as in military matters. It was
impossible to create a new Civil Service de novo, and, to begin with,
the new Civil Service would have to be recruited from the Indian
Political Service, the Foreign Office, and the Egyptian and Soudan
Civil Services. He was convinced that it was undesirable to keep
Egypt under the Foreign Office. Diplomatic training did not make
good administrators, and the diplomats who had undertaken service
as administrators in Egypt weiv not improved as diplomatists. The
future services of the Middle East would be mainly concerned with
administration, and only secondarily with diplomatic work. As far
as he had been able to ascertain, everyone in the Egyptian service,
other than the diplomats, were in favour of the change he advocated,
but this Egyptian service suffered irom being too small, and from
the absence of life and movement.
Mr. Montagu stated that while lie agreed with Lord Robert Cecil
in principal, and shared his view regarding the desirability of the
formation of a new Middle Eastern Department separate from both