Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎149v] (298/544)

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then drafted a telegram to this effect to be sent to the Senior Naval
Officer.
Admiral Hope then read the draft telegram.
General Macdonogh thought that the time had come to
reconsider our position as regards the Caspian Sea and whether it
was still necessary to secure control of the shipping.
Lord Robert Cecil stated that Enver was reported to be
intending to retire to the Caucasus, and to set up a separate
Azerbaijan State. In view of this, the control of the Caspian was
still essential. Moreover, it was possible that General Alexitff might
still succeed in setting up an independent State north of the
Caucasus, in which case the control of the Caspian would be of
importance to us, unless the Allied troops operating from another
direction managed to secure the Black Sea. It was possible that
Enver might try and revive the Pan-Turanian movement. He thought
that we were bound to sink any ship on the Caspian which refused
to obey our orders.
The Chairman thought that there was sufficient reason for
retaining control of such shipping as had come into our hands, but
that arguments .for sinking ships under the control of Bicharakoff
were not so convincing. He suggested that a telegram should be
sent to the S.N.O. saying that, in view of the changed circumstances
at Constantinople, our policy now, while preventing any hostile
movement or action in the Caspian, was to suspend previous
instructions to sink vessels which were controlled by Bicharakoff'.
Lord Robert Cecil thought that the telegram might be to the
effect that previous orders were cancelled ; that our object was to
interrupt any movement of hostile intent into 1 rans-Caspia; and
that if any warships attempted to interfere with such measures as
we might adopt to achieve this object they were to be sunk.
Mr. Montagu said that he understood that this would not apply
in the case of Russian merchant ships transporting troops across the
Caspian. This would be an unfriendly act on the part of slops
which were not warships.
General Macdonogh pointed out that one of Bicharakoff’s
reasons for retaining the fleet was to enable him to co-operate with
General Denikin who was friendly to us. He thought that the
instructions it had been suggested should be sent to the Senior
Naval Officer constituted an unjustifiable interference in the internal
affairs of the Russians and might upset Denikin’s plans.
Lord Robert Cecil thought that General Denikin was bound to
keep us informed of his plans so that he could act in concert
with us.
Admiral Hope referred to a later telegram from the G.O.C.-in-C.
Mesopotamia, X. 3407 (E.C. 2109) which stated that the North
Persian Force had received a telegram from Bicharakoff asking for
1*2 ships, of which the majority were at Enzeli ; a reply had been
sent that owing to the scarcity of oil fuel these ships were immobile,
and that should Bicharakoff still press for these ships the North
Persian Force would refuse to send them.
General Thwaites urged that nothing should be done which
would alienate Bicharakoff.
General Macdonogh said that the principal reason why we
wished to control the Caspian shipping was to prevent hostile
movement acioss Trans-Caspia and Turkestan from threatening
India. Now this menace had been removed our raison d'etre on the
Caspian no longer existed.
T1 ie Chairman said he was opposed to sinking ships just because
they did not happen to be in our hands. It was, however, still
necessary for us to control the Caspian, and consequently we must
take measures to stop vessels which might be moving with
hostile intent.