Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎121v] (242/544)

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He was sure that in later years we would regret the introduction
of neutral officers.
The Chairman thought that there was general agreement as
to the desirability of getting rid of the South Persia Rifles, or, at
least, of British control of it. We also wanted to be able to with
draw our troops from South Persia. If Cox and the local political
authorities were satisfled that the South Persia Rifles could be
transferred to Firman A Persian word meaning a royal order or decree issued by a sovereign, used notably in the Ottoman Empire (sometimes written ‘phirmaund’). Firma without disturbing the tranquillity
of the country, then our sanction should be accorded. He sug
gested that the reply to Sir Percy Cox should be that His Majesty's
Government were in general agreement with his three first pro
posals; they were, however, doubtful about the suggested neutral
Commission, and would prefer, for the present, to postpone a
decision on that point. Before replying to the Persian Govern
ment, however, they would like to know if our victories in # *
Palestine had modified Vossugh's claims.
Mr. Balfour enquired whether, supposing we handed over
the South Persia Rifles to Firman A Persian word meaning a royal order or decree issued by a sovereign, used notably in the Ottoman Empire (sometimes written ‘phirmaund’). Firma, we proposed to continue % *
to pay for the force. He understood that we had even been paying
neutral officers, who had done us nothing but harm. In his view,
tiie only logical policy to adopt was, so long as we pay the officers,
those officers must be British.
The Chairman then referred to the latter part of Cox’s tele
gram, in which it was suggested that after the issue of the pro
posed communique, Persia should at once address draft notes to
both belligerents, appealing to them to withdraw their troops
from Persian soil, and not to make the heart of Persia the cock-
pit of their struggle. Turkey would, obviously, refuse to comply,
as she could not agree to give up Azerbaijan, and Great Britain,
in view of the Turkish attitude, would likewise refuse. The
Chairman said that he did not think this at all advisable.
Lord Robert Cecil agreed that the suggestion of draft notes
was dangerous. He wished to know, however, what exactly our
policy was. Was it (a) towards a protectorate, or (b) towards an
independent Persia ?
Mr. Montagu did not agree that the draft notes proposal was
necessarily dangerous. Our own intention was to evacuate- South
Persia as soon as order was restored. We could not, however,
evacuate the Kasvin Road, as we are maintaining ourselves there
simply in order to keep the Turks out of Persia. Our cordon
there was necessary in order to exclude both the Turks and the
Germans. He himself differentiated between the maintenance of
our cordon on the frontiers of Persia and the maintenance of v %
forces in the interior. The north-west cordon was necessary to
exclude the Germans and Turks from Persia; the north-east
cordon was necessary to keep them away, possibly, from India.
We had, however, in his view, no justification at all for being in # •
Persia. He disliked intensely the present quite untenable and
unjustifiable position of being armed in a country with which we
were not allied. This could be cured by an alliance on Persia
entering the war.
Mr. Balfour said that the point was, to his mind, what war
measures were really necessary ? Supposing the Turks were to
withdraw, what guarantee was there that they and the Germans
would not return ? We could not afford to run any such risk.
He pointed out that the suggested draft note made no reference
to the Germans.
Sir Eyre Crowe added: “Or to the Russians.” As regards
Mr. Montagu’s point, we were in Persia because the enemy were
there.
(Here followed a brief discussion as to whether or not, when
the question had last been discussed, the Committee had
been in favour of an alliance with Persia, or merely of
maintaining her present neutrality).