Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎121r] (241/544)

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tary Intelligence, copies of whose note of the 26th September to
the Foreign Office (E.C.-T677) had been circulated to the Com
mittee, that Cox’s telegram must have been sent before the news
of Allenby’s victories had reached Teheran. He understood that
the War Office had arranged that military news should be
regularly communicated to the Chief Commissioner there, and he
suggested that the latter should be asked what effect the more
favourable situation in Palestine would be likely to have upon
Vossugh. The War Office note stated that the General Staff had
no objection to the introduction of French-Swiss officers into the
South Persia Rifles; they were, however, quite unable to agree
to the course of action suggested in the latter part of Cox’s tele
gram. It appeared to them dangerous in the extreme to count
upon a Turkish refusal to agree to the evacuation of Persian
territory by both belligerents, and the mere presentation of such
a note, whether refused or accepted by the Ottoman Government,
would seriously embarrass General Marshall. In the view of the
General Staff, the aim of British policy in Persia should be an
alliance with that country. As regards the transference of control
of the South Persia Rifles and the withdrawal of British troops
from Pars, the Chairman wondered if our political agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Shiraz
had been consulted in the matter. He thought the Committee were
agreed in principle with the proposal to hand this force over, but
when this should be done was a delicate matter. It was a serious
business to hand over 5,000 armed and more or less trained men
to a Persian commander.
Lord Robert Cecil thought that the reply to Cox’s telegram
should be to the effect that we have already agreed to (1) and (2)
of his proposals, and as regards (3), we would accept French-Swiss
officers, but were doubtful about Scandinavians. As regards the
point raised by the Chairman, he thought that Cox would have
been certain to have consulted Shiraz, but the point might be
brought out in our reply by saying: “ You have no doubt consulted
Shiraz as to the local effect of these proposals.”
Mr. Montagu referred to the Viceroy’s telegram of the 21st
instant (E.C.-1659), which stated:—
“ We can see no objection to eventual appointment of
Swiss officers, provided that they are French-Swiss, on terms
proposed by War Office, but we think, in the first instance,
it is desirable to make the greatest political capital possible
out of the abandonment of the South Persia Rifles by
announcing this without stipulation as to subsequent employ
ment of Swiss officers.”
Mr. Montagu agreed that all the capital possible should be made
out of our surrender of the South Persia Rifles, and thought
that a decision about the nationality of neutral officers should
be postponed for the present. He reminded the Committee that
some time previously when we had instructed Marling to
negotiate with a view to putting Vossugh in power, one of the
baits held out was the possible surrender of this force. Cox’s
suggestion was that, before the suggested Commission should
arrive in Persia, the Shiraz Brigade should be handed over to
Firman A Persian word meaning a royal order or decree issued by a sovereign, used notably in the Ottoman Empire (sometimes written ‘phirmaund’). Firma, and that, if the experiment was successful, it
should be adopted in the case of the Kerman Brigade also. On
the whole, he was quite prepared to accept proposals (I), (2), and
(3) of Cox’s telegram. His policy had always been to get rid of
the South Persia Rifles, as he did not think that we needed them,
and felt they embarrassed us.
Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that if we agreed to these pro
posals, we should lie tied to admitting neutral officers into the
South Persia Rifles. It was quite clear that one result of the
recent severe defeats sustained by the Turks would be that we
need not now pay so big a price for a friendly Persian Cabinet.
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