Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎120r] (239/544)

Saud were exactly the same pattern as those we had given to other
Arabian chiefs.
Mr. Montagu did not think that High Commissioner, Cairo,
was against the gilt of the rifles. His recollection was that Sir
it. Wingate had concurred in the desirability of giving ibn Saud
sufficient rifles to keep him friendly. What Bagdad and he him
self feared was that if Ibn Saud did not get the rifles he wanted,
he would be so disgusted that he would determine to attack King
liussein. Sir Mark Sykes had suggested to him that it might be
desirable to send a telegram to enquire whether our recent successes
in Palestine would modify, in any way, the advice which the Chief
Political Officer had given us.
Sir Mark Sykes said that, owing to the said successes, Arabia
was more or less negligible at the present moment, and was
growing more so every day. Every fresh rifle meant potential
trouble. We had given Ibn Saud the promised 1,000 rifles, and
he was sure that any arms we gave him would sooner or later be
turned against King Hussein. Ibn Saud was running the Ikhwan
sect, which, in his opinion, had been started by Turkish agents, and
there was consequently a great danger of his becoming a Turkish
agent himself. Sir Mark said that he himself was against substi
tuting more up-to-date weapons.
Mr. Balfour thought that everything depended upon the exact
terms of our original pledge. Whatever our bargain was, it must
be carried out. If it could be shown that we had in any way been
guilty of sharp practice, we ought to make immediate amends.
the Committee decided—
(a.) That the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. should telegraph to the Chief
Commissioner at Bagdad, pointing out that the 1,000
rifles aicen to Ibn Saud were serviceable, and of the
same pattern that we gave to other A rabian chiefs; and
that we had consequently fulfilled our promise to him.
Before further considering whether rifles of a more
up-to-date pattern should be substituted, His Majesty's
Government would be glad to know whether recent
military events in Palestine affected in any way the
advice * given in Chief Political Officer’s telegram
No. 7710 0 / the \5th instant (£.(7.-1577).
(b.) That the question of a meeting between Ibn Saud and
King Hussein, or between their respective sons, should
stand over for the present.
(c.) That Mr. Philby should be allowed to proceed on leave,
and that the High Commissioner in Egypt should be
invited to depute an officer of the Egyptian Service to
succeed him, the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and Foreign Office to take
the necessary action.
(At this point General Wilson withdrew.)
3. The Chairman said that recent information from the
Caspian indicated that we have, or had at one time, a considerable
amount of shipping in our hands, and that Bicharakof now claimed
to control the Caspian fleet. Since the Committee last met, the
Admiralty had sent a very strongly worded telegram to the Com
mander-in-chief, East Indies (E.C.-1664) (Appendix II), and he
invited Admiral Hope to give an explanation.
Admiral Hope said that the Admiralty and the War Office had
come to the conclusion that our men on the spot did not seem to be
fully alive to the enormous importance of securing the C aspian
fleet; at any rate, the measures they were adopting to effect this
were not vigorous enough for the purpose. In consequence, both
Departments decided to telegraph in strong terms to the Com
mander-in-chief, East Indies, and General Marshall respectively.