Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎119v] (238/544)

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owing to inevitable restrictions and demands made upon private
land transport. The Treasury were still awaiting replies to a
question put in two very important telegrams, which had been
sent a week or two previously, notably one to General Marshall.
The Committee were impressed with the gravity of the situa
tion, and—
(a.) Requested Mr. Keynes to communicate to members of
the Committee, through the Secretary, the result of
the conference that afternoon.
(b.) Authorised the Secretary of State for India to send to
India a telegram 'pointing out the necessity of releas
ing at once, for trade purposes, transport in the south
of Persia which had been temporarily commandeered
for military use.
(c.) Decided that the question should be discussed again by
the Committee as soon as intimation was received from
Mr. Keynes that his Department was in possession of
the required information.
(Mr. Keynes withdrew.)
Ibn Saud. 2. The Committee had before them a note by the Political
Department, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , upon our relations with Ibn Saud
(E.C.-1648) (Appendix I), and copies of me most recent telegrams
on the subject.
The Chairman said that the situation had changed since
the question had last been discussed by the Committee (E.C. 30th
Meeting, Minute 7). Our recent policy had been to dissuade
Ibn Saud from attacking tbn Rashid, and we had sought to divert
his activities against the Ajman. In the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. note three
recommendations were made:—
(i.) That as regards the proposal to arrange a meeting
between representatives of Ibn Saud and King
Hussein, a further report should be awaited.
(ii.) That Sir R. Wingate should be invited to depute an
officer of the Egyptian Service to succeed Mr. Philby
as British representative with Ibn Saud.
(iii.) That the question of supplying Ibn Saud with 1,000
serviceable rifles in substitution of the inferior
weapons already delivered to him should be considered.
An important telegram had been received on the subject from
the Chief Political Officer at Bagdad (E.C.-1577), warning His
Majesty’s Government that their refusal to replace the 1,000
rifles was calculated to precipitate a conflagration, as it would
disgust Ibn Saud, and alienate him from the sympathy of his
adherents. The Chairman said that it seemed that all the
authorities at the Eastern end of the line were in favour of our
substituting, for the rifles already sent, weapons of an up-to-date
pattern, and he himself was inclined to think that this course
ought to be adopted.
Lord Robert Cecil reminded the Committee that our pledge
of the 9th March, 1918, had been literally fulfilled. We had
given Ibn Saud the 1,000 rifles we had promised, but we never
stipulated that they should be of the latest type. He himself was
afraid that if we replaced these with first-rate weapons they
would only be used against King Hussein, who was, at present, in
a rather queer state of mind, and prepared strongly to resent any
favour shown to his rival. Though Bagdad supported the gift of
up-to-date weapons, Cairo was opposed.
General Wilson said that Sir George Macdonogh took the
same view as Lord Robert, viz., that really good weapons would be
turned against King Hussein. The rifles we had given to Ibn