Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎106v] (212/544)

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mainly owing to his own representations that the expedition to
Baku had been undertaken. The Commander-in-Chiei in India,
on the other hand, seemed to side with Dunsterville (E.C.-1408 and
E.C.-1410), and evidently took the view that the venture was still
worthy of being pursued, and that the general situation in North-
West Persia was not affected by Dunsterville s reluctance to with
draw from Baku. From the latest telegrams it did indeed appear
that the situation at Baku had improved. Although the lurks were
in possession of the oilfields, no other attacks had been made upon
the town. Dunsterville was of opinion that if Baku could hold
out for a few days more, the situation might still be saved, as he
hoped with the ships at his disposal to get reinforcements from
General Bicharakoff. The Central Caspian Government was also
unwilling to permit the evacuation of Baku by Dunsterville, unless
he were accompanied by the other parties who were assisting in the
defence of the town. In the circumstances, the physical difficult!as
involved in effecting a withdrawal seemed to be insuperable.
Commodore Norris reached Enzeli on the 2nd September, and a
telegram had been received from Colonel Stokes, who was acting
C.G.S. to General Dunsterville, stating that Commodore Norris
was now 7 in command of a fleet. One telegram suggested that ten
ships were now at our disposal and were being armed. However,
an undated telegram had been received on the 10th September from
Commodore Norris stating that he had not so far gained control of
any ships, and that Baku was holding out under bombardment, and
would fall but for the fact that a land attack had not been pressed.
It seemed likely from this telegram that Commodore Norris had
himself reached Baku, but the telegram itself might be several
days old. „
General Macdonogh stated that, in the absence of the Chief ot
the Imperial General Staff in France, he had consulted Lord
Milner upon the situation. Lord Milner was inclined to agree
with the line taken by the Commander-in-Chief in India, and
thought that if there was any chance of Bicharakoff reinforcing
Baku or of co-operation by the Terek Cossacks, and in view of our
recent successes on the Western front, it would be a great mistake
to evacuate Baku unless actually compelled to do so by force. In
regard to the military situation, General Dunsterville had by now
about two battalions of British troops in Baku, the rest of the
brigade of which these two battalions formed part being dis
tributed between Hamadan (inclusive) and Enzeli. There were
two companies in Kasvin, and two companies in Enzeli. If the
whole brigade were to be moved to Baku, as asked by Dunsterville,
the forceson the Hamadan-Enzeli road would have to be replaced
by other troops sent up from Mesopotamia. The Turks were
undoubtedly advancing from Tabriz along the Mianeh-Zinjan
road. Their force consisted of about 1,500 men of the 11th
Caucasian Division, and in no circumstances whatever could the
Hamadan road be left unprotected. The Turkish force opposite
Baku consisted of about 1.000 sabres, 6,000 rifles, 100 machine
p'liTis, and 26 ffufts. TIib l urks also had the assistance of about
£ 000 Irregulars. The Germans had 5,500 rifles in Trans-
Caucasia, chiefly in the Poti-Tiflis area. It was doubtful whether
the Germans would come to the assistance of the Turks at Baku.
The Chairman referred to a report that an agreement had
been concluded between the Germans and Turks, under which the
Turks "were to retain Baku on condition that they provided the
Germans with oil. The question was, whether it would be possible
for Dunsterville to hold out in the long run, even if he were
reinforced by Bicharakoff. .
General Macdonogh stated that the latter question depended
verv largely on the development of the situation in Cis-Caucasia,
where matters seemed to have improved. General Alexieff was
somew 7 here in the neighbourhood of Tsaritsin, with 25,000 men.