Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎92v] (184/544)

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itself if and when it is afforded an adequate military backing. In the opinion of the
Foreign Office it is essential that political control in Persia should remain in
London.
As regards the military and political control of the war areas from Palestine
eastwards, this presumably includes the Hedjaz and Arabia where Arab forces are
co-operating with General Allenby. To transfer the political control of this area to
India would entail the bankruptcy of the Arab movement, to which we are com
mitted. The Government of India is fundamentally anti-Arab and anti-Sherif, and
subconsciously pro-Turkish. It would not be able to handle the Arab movement
with sympathy, still less to manage our delicate relations with the French and
Italians in Arabia and Palestine. To sever the Palestine and Hedjaz campaigns
from Egypt w T ould be a mistake. Both are dependent upon Egypt for supplies,
railway material, labour, personnel, and advances in specie or notes, &c. The
political control of this area should also remain in London.
Foreign Office, July 17, 1D1H.
With the general tone and intention of Mr. Montagu’s paper I find myself in
hearty agreement. I do think that there is room for improvement in the methods
with which we have dealt in the past with Persia and the Middle East.
1 . The Eastern Committee is an exceedingly valuable body. It is obvious that
a number of questions must arise in connection with the areas with which it deals,
which are properly speaking Cabinet questions; that is to say, either they raise
large issues of policy, or they involve difference of opinion on important points
between the departments concerned. The decision of such questions requires know
ledge of a rather special kind, and necessarily consumes some time. For both
reasons it would be highly inconvenient to refer them to the War Cabinet, and they
are likely to receive more instructed attention from a body such as the Eastern
Committee.
2. But for executive purposes the Eastern Committee is not a convenient instru
ment. It necessarily meets comparatively seldom, and even so is a great burden on
the time of the very busy men who constitute the Committee.
I agree therefore with Mr. Montagu that executive matters should, as far as
possible, 0 be dealt with either by the individual departments immediately concerned,
or by informal consultations between two or more departments, and I trust that this
svstem will be increasingly adopted in the future. In any important matter the
Chairman of the Committee should be consulted just as the Prime Minister is, or
ought to be, consulted in other departmental questions.
3. Further, I agree with Mr. Montagu that it would be desirable for the Foreign
Office and, as far as I can judge, for the War Office also, to create a special depart
ment for dealing with Middle Eastern affairs. Whether ultimately they should be
put under the control of an entirely independent office or not may be left for future
consideration, since we are all agreed it cannot be conveniently done during the war.
But the lesser reform may be carried out at once. To a large extent it has already
been done in the Foreign Office, and I should personally be glad to see the process
carried further.
4 In mv judgment, Mr. Montagu is right in thinking that it would be desirable
to place the political interests of the whole of this district in one hand, but I entirely
agree with the War Office that it would be impossible, without grave disadvantage,
to entrust the political control to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . Such a change would, I am con-
vmced be very much resented, not only in Persia, but in Egypt, Arabia, and Fales-
tine also and'would besides involve very large changes in the existing system which
it would not be convenient to make during the war. Whether it would be possible to
transfer so much of political control as is now held by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. to the proposed
Middle Eastern Department of the Foreign Office is a matter on which I am not in a
oosition to express a decided opinion, but I think it ought to be considered.
5 As for the military side, I cannot think that Mr. Montagu s suggestion would
work ' I am confident that all important military operations m this war must be
directed bv the General Staff, and that whenever we have departed from that prm-
ciole we have had reason to regret it. Unquestionably the Mesopotamia misfortunes
would have been much less likely to occur if the control of the operations there had
always been in London, and so long as the operations in Arabia, at Rabegh, &c., were