Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎92r] (183/544)

The War in the East.
Departmental Note by the Foreign Office on Mr. Montagu's Paper of the 5th July,
1918, to which are appended Notes by the Secretary of State and Assistant
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
(Previous Papers E.C.-718 and E.C.-809.)
The following observations are the Departmental views of the Foreign Office on
the memorandum by the Secretary of State for India of the 5th July :—
It is undoubtedly true that one of the defects of the constitution of the Eastern
Committee is that action in important matters meets occasionally with some delay
owing to the difficulty of calling the Committee together to decide on the questions
submitted to them. It has been noticed that a considerable number of questions of
secondary importance relating to the situation in the East which are now submitted
to the Committee are capable of inter-departmental adjustment without recourse to
the Committee, and it would seem that any modification of procedure to be intro
duced in dealing with matters of this character could best be made by withdrawing
such questions from the control of the Committee and leaving them to be decided
inter-departmentally as was formerly the case before this Committee was constituted.
Questions of policy may be just as urgent as those requiring early executive action,
but they are not nearly as frequent, and consequently the difficulty of calling the
Committee quickly together will not be so often experienced. The Committee
should, however, decide upon all questions of policy and should consider and advise
the departments concerned as to the best means for carrying it out. Such a modi
fication would be simple, would cause no confusion, and would add to the efficiency
and rapidity of the action to be taken. It is practically another form of the sub
committee proposed by Mr. Montagu, but it would be less cumbersome, and would
have the advantage of not compelling the presence of others than those who are
directly and departmentally interested in the questions at issue.
Nevertheless it can hardly be denied that the Eastern Committee in its present
form has proved a very useful branch of the War Cabinet. It has performed a
considerable amount of substantial work under the able Chairman who presides at its
meetings. It may have its imperfections—there are few bodies that have not—but
it is doubtful whether the conduct of affairs now under the control of the Committee
would either in the present or the future be improved by any material change in its
present form of organisation. At this stage of the war any broad variation in the
machinery of Government is to be deprecated as likely to cause confusion and delay,
and it is doubtful whether any improvement would be obtained by a change.
Such a view applies equally to the executive problem as raised in the note which
is now under review.
As regards Persia, Mr. Montagu points out with considerable reason and force
that the system of dual control, which has worked comparatively well in the past,
has been strained to breaking point by the circumstances of the war, but regarding
the situation in its purely political aspect there is no reason for holding the opinion
that undivided Indian control in Persia would produce better results. In fact it
may be stated without contradiction that knowledge experience gained in
Persia is to be found far more easily in London than it is in Simla or Delhi. It
should not be forgotten either that when the Persians professed to fear Imperialistic
or annexationist designs on the part of Great Britain their eyes were turned to India
rather than to London. The feeling in Persia against India and Indian officials is
traditional, and were the whole of the policy in Persia to be conducted from ^ imla
that feeling would undoubtedly become aggravated. Our present difficulties in
Persia need not be ascribed so much to faults of system as of persons. We had to
choose between a policy of conciliation which, in the existing world-military
situation, might well have been considered as weakness by the Oriental mind, thus
aggravating the position, and a “ strong” policy. After deciding upon the latter
w r e found that the Military Authorities were unable to supplv the required forces in
the required time in order to carry this policy into effect. Our policy will rig
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