Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎91r] (181/544)

11
E.C.-809.
Xote on Mr. Montagu’s Memorandum “ The War in the East.”
I ne \V ar Office can accept the general argument underlying the preamble of
Mi. Montagu s memorandum, namely, that when the enemy’s ehort in the West is
suspended, ne is likely to seek a military success in the East. Possibly too great a
measure of certainty is attached to this assumption, but the principle forms a sound
basis not only for discussion but for precautionary measures, both political and
military.
2 . The second part of the memorandum deals with the constitution of the
Eastern Committee. Mr. Montagu’s statement that the present organisation
inevitably leads to action being frequently delayed cannot be disputed. Not only is
action delayed owing to the necessity of obtaining the sanction of the Committee to
e\ery step taken in the execution of policy already laid down by the Committee, but
a ruling as to important questions of policy has on several occasions been postponed
from one meeting to another owing to the fact that the Committee is overburdened
with executive action. To remed } 7 this, Mr. Montagu makes the following sug-
gestions :—
(a.) The Eastern Committee should be a Committee of Ministers only, with
expert advice available at the time of its sittings.
(&.) The Committee should not attempt actual executive action, but that it
should, as a Cabinet Committee, discuss questions of high policy, leaving
details of the conduct of the policy to the Departments concerned. .
(c.) That a sub-committee composed as follows should be set up :—
An Under-Secretary of State, or Assistant Under-Secretary of State
from the Foreign Office and India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. .
The Director of Military Intelligence.
ihis sub-committee to be empowered to give decisions except on matters of high
policy or of exceptional importance.
The War Office are in general accord with the above suggestions, and consider
that (&) and (c) are of great importance.
With regard to suggestion (a) the War Office consider that the C.I.G.S. or his
representative (normally the D.M.I.) should be a member of the Committee.
The inclusion of a representative of the Treasury on the sub-committee would be
necessary.
3. The third part of the memorandum deals with the dual system of political
control reigning in Persia. That this system has not stood the test of war is evident
from the present situation in Persia, but whether it is the fault of the system or of
the executive is open to discussion. It has been pointed out that the open transfer
of Persia from Foreign Office to India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. control would give rise to great appre
hension in Persia, wffiere the politicians would at least pretend to regard it is a
symbol of annexation. Certainly enemy propagandists would treat it as such. Nor
can we only consider Persia herself and our enemies in this connection, but it is
necessary to remember that both France and the United States are at present dis
playing a great and probably not wholly altruistic interest in the affairs of Persia,
and the transfer of that country to the sphere of India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. control would be very
ill-received by our Allies.
Further, although this is a matter in which the War Office are not directly
concerned, it would appear that such a radical change would be most difficult to
carry through under war conditions.
In view of the above, a change of instrument is recommended rather than a
change of system. I do not wish to cast aspersions on the present Minister at
Teheran, but at the same time I feel bound to endorse the views expressed in the
Viceroy’s telegram of the 9th July, appended to Mr. Montagu’s memorandum, and
to add that the general staff have long been of the opinion that the personality of
the Minister of Teheran has been one of the most adverse factors with which we have
had to contend in Persia.
In view of the great qualifications and experience of Sir P. Cox, and in order
to obtain unity of political control, I would suggest that the functions of that officer
should be extended, and that he should be put in charge of the Legation at Teheran