Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎84v] (168/544)

6
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The Strategical
Situation.
of being able to hold Baku, where our garrison would not be in danger
so long as they had shipping to get them away. The best defensive
position for Baku was about 15 miles out. As regards German
troops, these were being brought into the Caucasus by degrees;
four battalions were already there and two more were on their way.
The Germans were probably experiencing considerable transport
difficulties, but it was no doubt that they meant eventually to under
take an offensive in Azerbaijan. The 5th Turkish Division was at,
or about, Ururnia ; its intention was to dispose of the Jelus, whom,
unfortunately, we were unable to assist, and to get into touch with
the 6 th Army, while the 11th (Caucasus Division was to concentrate
at Tabriz and reconnoitre towards Mianeh. Ihe l urkish plan was
possibly to evacuate Armenia, and to bring up a force in the
Urumia-Tabriz area of 7 divisions, which might provide a force of
about 12,000 rifles, for an advance on Kasvin. The Turks evidently
did not wish to be entirely dependent on the German lines of
communication from Georgia, and were anxious to start alternative
lines from Erzerum, and also further south through Alardin and
Karput
8 . General Smuts said that the strategical situation in Persia
was one which must give rise to the gravest apprehensions. The
Turks were withdrawing from in front of Mosul with the intention
of concentrating against our forces on the Hamadan-Resht road,
whereby our whole position in Persia would be exposed and turned.
He thought it the duty of the Committee to examine the whole
situation most carefully with the least possible delay, and to
ascertain both the probable strength of forces that might be
brought against us, and the maximum number of troops we might
be able to oppose to them. Our line of communication was
strategically bad, as it was parallel to the front of the enemy s
advance, and simply invited attack. He enquired if we could not
find and prepare alternative lines of communication, say from
Bushire or Bundar Abbas, through Shiraz and Ispahan.
General Macdonogh agreed that, stragetically, the situation
was bad. There appeared to be three alternatives :—
(a.) To run a railway from Khanikin to Kasvin. f his would
take at least a year, and to carry it over the Tak-i
Ghirreh pass would be a very difficult engineering feat.
Over the pass itself a ropeway might be all that would
be possible.
( 6 .) To run a railway from Ahwaz to Khoremabad, and thence
to Hamadan. This route had been surveyed, and was
feasible, and the project would be sound strategically.
If this were done, we might feel confident about our
power to resist a Turkish advance unsupported by
German troops.
(c.) To carry a line up the Tigris and into North-West
Persia, over the Varna pass, which was much less
formidable than the Tak-i-Ghirreh. This would not be
a good line for the support of our troops on the road, but
it would threaten the enemy’s flank, and attract his
troops into Mesopotamia.
Any railway, to be really useful, would take at least a year to
construct, and the great difficulty about motor transport was the oil
supply, which would be very greatly facilitated if oil could be
brought from Baku to Enzeli.
The Chairman, speaking from personal experience, said that the
country from Bushire to Shiraz was impracticable as a main line of
advance, although north of Shiraz it was easy. A railway from
Dizful, where the plains ended, towards Khoremabad, would also