Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎84r] (167/544)

5
C
[365—22]
Baku and the
Caucasus.
Mr. Judson. Mr. Oliphant also alluded to the decision taken in
February to deprecate French co-operation in Persia, and submitted
for consideration whether to give support now to the Americans
might not raise a difficult point with the French.
Mr. Shuckburgh said that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. proposed to telegraph
privately to the Viceroy about the Mission, explaining the situation.
The Committee decided—
Tliat facilities should be given to Mr. Judson's Mission to proceed
to Persia subject to the following provisos :—
(1.) That, before the Missioti started, our policy in Persia
and the question of the exchange shordd be carefully
explained to Mr. Judson.
( m J.) 'That Mr. Judson should give an undertaking that he
would do nothing without consulting Sir P. Cox.
(3.) That the Mission should be directed to those parts of
Persia wJiere British influence was predominant.
7. General Macdonogh said that the Baku garrison originally
held a position some 40 miles from the town. This, however, had
been turned from the north and a new position had been taken up,
which was only 4 versts from Baku, which was consequently under
shell lire. The enemy had at present only 10 guns and some 7,000
Turks and Tartars. Opposing them were a miscellaneous crowd of
8,000 combatants under five different leaders, and about 40 guns.
Our own reinforcements proceeding in that direction were 8 armoured
cars, 360 men of the North Staffords, 2 machine gun sections, and,
in addition, 7 officers and 40 other ranks which had been sent up by
Dunsterville. Stokes had gone to Baku and was trying to get
into touch with Bicharakov, who had moved to Ohachmas on the
4th August. According to the fleet, Bicharakov was coming south,
but this report had not been confirmed. Stokes further stated
(E.C.-1073) that it was impossible to arrange for the destruction of
the oil-fields as the latter were full of Tartar workmen who were
pro-Turk and unwilling to destroy the means of their own liveli
hood, while a number of Russian troops were similarly interested.
General Macdonogh said that the principal object of our troops now
at, or on their way to, Baku was to get the fleet away from that
place to Enzeli or Krasnovodsk. Most of the fleet was said to have
gone to Astrakhan, whence it was reported that it might be
employed in transporting Bolsheviks to Krasnovodsk. We had cut
one of the pipe-lines, but the damage caused had been insignificant.
In reply to questions, General Macdonogh said it would be quite
possible to run off the reservoirs into the sea if we could get control
of them, and also to drop incendiary bombs on the reservoirs,
though this might cause great loss of life to the local inhabitants.
Lord Robert Cecil enquired whether the Admiralty fully realised
that the key to the whole situation was the control of the Caspian.
After a brief discussion, the Committee decided :—
(a.) That Lord Robert Cecil should arrange to meet an ojficcr of
the Naval Staff and the Director of Military Intelligence
to discuss measures to be taken to secure control of the
Caspian, and to report the result to the Committee.
(b.) That the War Office should again telegraph to the General
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamia, urging the
supreme importance of destroying the pipe-lines and
reservoirs, if by any means practicable.
General Macdonogh. proceeding, explained the. position of
enemy forces in the Caucasus. At present the only troops in front
of Baku were the 5th Caucasian Corps, which was not of high fighting
value. He thought that, against the existing enemy, we had a chance