Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎77r] (153/544)

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Geoeral
Dunsterville.
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telegram (E,0.-954) which had been circulated to the Committee
on the situation at Baku had contained Mr. McDonnell's report,
which stated, among other things, that everything depended upon
the attitude of the fleet; although at a general meeting of all hands
the fleet voted against British help, n 'vertheless the real force,
consisting of the two gunboats and one light auxiliary cruiser, were
willing to assist the landing of British force a week ago ; unfor
tunately no British force was then available, and it was now more
than probable that, owing to the open hostility of these three ships
to the Bolshevik Government on the subject of British aid, an
attempt to change the crews would be made, and Bolshevik sailors
had arrived from Russia for this purpose. The latest news from
Baku received by Mr. MacDonnell reported no change in the attitude
of these ships, which still remain friendly. Mr. Montagu said that
he did not understand why steps could not betaken either to destroy
or to remove these ships while the crews remain friendly, and bef >re
they were replaced.
General Macdonogh, in reply to a question, explained, with the
aid of a map, the present distribution of our troops between Hamadan
and Baku. The telegram he had read out had stated that General
Dunsterville was sending officers and N.C.O.’s to Baku itself, where
we had four armoured cars. At Enzeli we had three platoons, one
gun, and two aeroplanes. At Resht we had two British officers and
110 Indian infantry. Here, it appeared, the British Consulate had
been burnt, but the Jangalis had since evacuated the town, and
matters seem to have quieted down again. At Kasvin we had one
squadron of the 14th Hussars, two mountain guns, two and a quarter
companies of infantry in Ford cars, half a company of the Hamp-
shires, an aeroplane, seven light armoured cars, a battery of field
artillery, and also a section of an ammunition column. At Hamadan
there were two squadrons of cavalry, half a company of the Hamp-
* shires, a company of infantry in Ford cars, and the 1st echelon of
the 29th Infantry Brigade. Altogether along the line we had about
4,0(X) fighting men.
The Chairman thought that this was sufficient answer to
Sir C. Marling’s constant complaints about the inadequacy of
military support.
The Committee agreed that the news was rather more reassuring
and the position moi'e generally promising than they had
been for some time.
The Chairman said that, after the last meeting, the War Office
sent a telegram to the G.O.C. Mesopotamia (E.C. 898), expressing
dissatisfaction with General Dunsterville’s failure, in spite of the
large staff and adequate forces at his disposal, either to secure
Enzeli or to send any really useful information, and suggesting his
recall. The Chairman thought that the telegram should have been
submitted in advance either to the Committee or to its Chairman.
Meanwhile, General Dunsterville’s explanation of the difficulties
with which he was confronted had been received (E.C. 870). The
Commander-in-Chief in India had telegraphed (E.C. 921) that he
was disposed to think that, in view of Dunsterville’s want of success,
a change would be advisable. General Marshall, on the other hand,
had replied as follows (E.C. 951) :—
“ I deprecate Dunsterville’s replacement at present. In
my opinion he is only just now in a position to act on his
instructions. He is a man of character, and it would be difficult
to replace him.”
The Chairman said that he thought that the Committee 'would
accept General Marshall’s opinion. There was no doubt that the
difficulties of obtaining accurate and useful information had been