Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎73v] (146/544)

If the French came out with a liberal declaration of policy, there is no doubt in
my mind that a good deal more cohesion would be possible.
There are large political assets in America, North and South, which would be at
tie; disposal of the Entente cause if only the French would take a reasonable line.
Further, I am fairly sure that, provided the military situation in Palestine warranted
it, the Syrians of all kinds would welcome an Anglo-French invasion and givejactual
assistance, provided it was clear that it did not mean—
(i.) Imposing Ilejaz rule on Syria.
ii.) Imposing a foreign Hag on Syria.
(iii.) Bartering Syria to the Turks at a Peace Conference in return fora British
occupation of Mesopotamia and French commercial monopoly in Syria.
Meaopota m ian Sit nat ion.
With regard to Mesopotamia, it is not necessary to say much, the different factors
being already familiar to the Committee. They are :—*
(i.) The low state of civilisation of the riparian tribes.
(ii.) I he isolated nature, by reason of religion and tradition, of Kerbela and Nedjef.
(iii.) The great difference between Baghdad and Basra.
Anglo-French Relations.
The danger point in this matter lies in the following:—
(i.) A number of influential French Colonial and Clerical politicians have still very
impossible ideas about expansion and annexation in Syria.
(i : .) There is a strong dormant sentiment in regard to the Holy Land among the
French people, which is symbolised by the protectorate of Christians.
(iii.) Tne elements interested in Syria and Palestine were reared on the traditional
anti-English sentiments which are connected with Madagascar, Tunis, and
Fashoda. These sentiments are dormant, but by inexpert handling may be
roused to life again.
(iv.) There is a tendency to feel that Great Britain has not quite played up to
France in the matter ol the Agreement. M. Picot went out under the
impression that he was to participate in Palestinian administration. There
is much coni’mion on this, as Annex (A) will show. Anyway, M. Picot
found himself in an impossible position and did his best to maintain his
dignity without provoking a real rupture The French feel that we have
made good politically in Palestine by setting up an all-British adminis
tration. dhey now fear we may extend this all-British provisional
administration in Syria if the fortune of war carried us there.
Italian Position,
In considering the Italian attitude we have to take into account the following
facts: —
(a.) Italian influential opinion has no ideas about the modern outlook at all.
r J hey only think of annexations, strategic frontiers, &c.
(b.) They stick to the idea of equal shares, irrespective of effort, expenditure,
participation, or previous events.
(c.) They are iully aware that the Anglo-French Agreement gives them a castle in
Spain, that no one can put them in possession, that they could not take it,
that they could not hold it if they took it.
(d.) They are bitterly jealous of the French and cannot bear the idea of anything
being done without their assent.
Having analysed as above, I venture to define our objectives. Our main post-war
objective 1 take to be that a stable and progressive state of affairs shall reign in the
jion-Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire, subject to the following conditions :— 1
1 . 1 hat this state of affairs shall be established on a basis compatible with our
economic and political security in the Middle East.