Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎73r] (145/544)

7
APPENDIX.
(E.O.-S25.)
Memorandum by Sir Mark Sykes.
WITH, regard, to the memoranda already circulated, I think it would perhaps be
useful if I made a brief recapitulation of the whole Entente-Arab situation. 1 venture,
therefore, to analyse the various factors as follows :—
The King of llejaz is influenced by two considerations:
1. His ambition to be titular chief of the whole of the Arabic-speaking peoples.
2. His fear lest he be unwittingly contributing to the handing over of Arab
countries to European Powers, thus exposing himself to the public charge
of treachery and the private stings of his own conscience.
♦
With regard to the first of these considerations, I feel we have no concern; with
regard to the second, 1 feel we owe him not only sympathy, but that we ought to do
everything we can to help him.
As the King of Hejaz is an Arab and a strict Moslem, to him the idea of helping
Pluropean Powers to annex what is either Islamic or Arab country must naturally be
repugnant. I have no doubt that he is surrounded by advisers, some, doubtless, in
Turkish pay, who impress upon him, firstly, that the French wish to Prenchify Syria,
and that the British intend to ludianise* Mesopotamia, while the more fanatical
elements will insist that che French will destroy all religion on Syria, and the Indians
introduce idolatry into Mesopotamia. It is not difficult to imagine what torments this
kind of taunt obliges a man like the King of Hejaz to endure. That we should do
our best to relieve him of such fears seems lo me both politic and right.
r The Syrian Attitude.
The Syrian situation is complicated by the following divergencies of opinion among
Syrians: —
(i.) The Maronites desire independence of a greater Lebanon, because the existing
Lebanon is overcrowded, but on the other hand a greater Lebanon would
leave the Maronites in a narrow minority.
(ii.) The non-Moslem S} 7 rians, outside the Lebanon, viz., ( hristians, Jews, and
Metawilis, are somewhat apprehensive of an independent Syria because they
fear the}’ would be subjected to the Moslems.
(iii.) The Moslems desire Syrian independence, but are averse to being subjected, no
matter how indirectly, to the King of Hejaz, whom they regard as living in
unprogressive surroundings.
(iv.) The Christians are to a great degree pro-French, the Moslems mildly pro-
British, and decidedly anti-PVench.
(v.) The Druses are strongly anti-PVench.
(vi.) It is, however, almost certain that the vast mass of the people desire very
strongly to be free of Ottoman rule, and to be wholly divorced from the
Turkish Empire.
(vii.) These divergencies of opinion are reflected wherever Syrians are to be found.
In France, where there is a small colony of about S(M> to 1,000 who are
influential in politics; in Manchester, where there are about 300—a wealthy
mercantile community ; in the United States, where there are al'out 80,000,
mostly in Chicago, New York, and Boston—nearly all well-to-do. In the
Southern American States, viz., Argentine, Chili, and Brazil, perhaps over
100 , 000 .
The main point and the only point on which these parties are agreed is a desire to
be rid of the Turks, and a desire not to be annexed to a European State.
* Note.— By this is meant that the Turkish propagandists would play on the King’s racial and religious
feelings at one and the same time by impressing on him that we intend to de-Arabise the culture of Mesopo
tamia by pivoting it on Bombay, and to de-lslamise it by introducing Hinduism.
In