Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎71v] (142/544)

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through a native Government which was friendly to us. Syria was
under Turkish administration, and We could not certainly work
through this. All that we could do, he thought, when we got to
Syria was to let M. Picot advise as to French interests there just as
he did in Palestine. He suggested that a telegram should be sent
to General Alleuby saying that His Majesty's Government intend,
when we enter Syria, that the French shall be accorded certain
special privileges, and that General Allenby should be asked to
submit his views on the subject.
Mr. Balfour said that the Marquis Imperiali had been to see
him a few days ago, and that he had told the Italian Ambassador
that, so far as Palestine was concerned, His Majesty’s Government
recognised their obligation to grant equal consideration to the French
and the Italians. The Government of Palestine was eventually to be
internationalised, and therefore we could not give to the French
privileges we did not accord to the Italians. Syria, however, was
quite a different proposition. He fully appreciated the military point
of view, and it would certainly be necessary to explain to the French
that, when we entered Syria, military considerations must outweigh
all others. If the: French declined to accept this situation, there
would remain the alternative of issuing instructions to General
Allenby not to enter Syria at all, and this contingency might quietly
be pointed out to the French. In reply to a question, Mr. Balfour
said that M. Gambon had been too tactful so far to approach him
definitely on this subject, but there was no doubt that he, too,
recognised the possibility of fricticfn. If the Committee wished, he
would take an early opportunity of finding out from M. Gambon
whether the French Government felt very strongly about the agree
ment, and what their expectations were when we entered Syria.
Before he did this, however, it would be useful for him to know what
General Allen by* s views were.
Lord Robert Cecil thought that the Italians as well as the
French should have an Adviser on General Allenby’s staff ; and that,
as regards Syria, they should be told that when we got there they
would be shown every consideration. As regards the agreement,
he had asked M. Margerie and other Frenchmen whether they were
not prepared to drop it. He found, however, that, while nobody
believed it could ever be carried out, there was strong opposition to
its abrogation.
Mr. Montagu thought that perhaps too much importance was
attached to the actual title which the French Adviser or Commis
sioner would hold when we entered Syria. It did not really matter
how he was labelled, so long as he was subject to the orders of our
General. We must insist that, whatever administration may be set
up, he must be subject to the supreme jurisdiction of General
Allenby, so long as he was there.
General Smuts foresaw possibilities of friction in the future,
and these might be accentuated by the fact that M. Picot was mot
unpopular (so General Allenby had given him to understand)
among the Arabs.
Sir Mark Sykes expressed dissent.
Lord Hardinge was opposed at the present time to our
permitting the French to have two officers, one to be Adviser for
Palestine and another for Syria. He thought, however, that the
Italians should certainly have a representative on General Allenby’s
staff.
The Chairman and the members of the Committee concurred in
this objection.
The Committee decided that—
(i.) 'Hie Italians were entitled to have, on the Staff of the
General Officer Commanding in Palestine, a representa
tive of their own with a status equivalent to that of
M. Picot in relation to Palestine, hut that the French
could not be allowed to have two representatives there.