Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎71r] (141/544)

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terms of the first part of which he did not think the Committee
would lake exception :—
“ {n order to keep the Allies together, we must conciliate the
Italians. 1 suggest this were best done by agreeing to appoint an
Italian Adviser on Italian interests in Palestine, and a Irench
Adviser on French interests in Palestine, to the General Officer
Commanding E.F.F. M Picot is prepared to support this idea.
If it be accepted, there is a complete end to inequality, and the
Advisers’duties can be defined. The Italians will not, 1 think, be
difficult in matters of definition and limitation so long as it is clear
that there is no difference in status between the two Advisers. ^ e
must also conciliate the French. This we can do by coming to an
understanding as to the position of the French High Commissioner
in Syria, in the event of our occupying any part of Syria. I am
aware that this is difficult, and military objections would be raised,
but the matter is one of importance, and I regard it essential to
disabuse the French of any idea of our having any ulterior motives
in Syria. I regard this suspicion on the part of the French as
dangerous to the Entente as a whole, and any arrangements we
may make in regard to Palestine must be such as to lead to its
removal.”
As regards the position in Syria, the Chairman said it was
important to know whether the question that had been raised by
Sir Mark Syl^es was due to the importunities of M. Picot or to
pressure from the French Government.
Sir Mark Sykes said that there was no doubt that the French
Government attached great importance to this question, and he
thought it very necessary to give the French an assurance that if,
and when, we get into Syria they will be accorded special privileges.
To this, he believed, the Italians would raise no objection, so long
as they were permitted to have on General Allenby s Staff a
representative of their own of equal status to M. Picot. The French
quite recognised that any administration that might be set up in
Syria must be subject to military considerations ; but they wanted
from us a definite guarantee that we will not treat Syria as we have
treated Palestine and take over its government ourselves. If we
did not give way on this point he apprehended serious trouble. As
regards the Syrians themselves, they admired French culture, but
they certainly did not desire French annexation. The Agreement
of iU1 1 i was dead, although the French refused to admit it. What
was required now was some modification of, or substitute for, that
Agreement, and he had prepared the paper, now before the Com
mittee, with the view of suggesting the lines on which the new
instrument should be drawn up. M. Picot himself was strongly
pro-Entente, so much so that he had been accused of selling Pales
tine to the English. He suggested that M. Picot should remain with
General Allenby to advise as to French interests in Syria, and that
another Frenchman, and also an Italian officer, should be attached
to the General Staff, to advise as to the interests of their respective
nations in Palestine.
General Macdonogh was quite certain that General Allenby
would strongly object to having a French High Commissioner
administering Syria when he got there, although he might be
prepared to agree to having an Italian as well as a F rench Adviser
on his Staff in Palestine. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was founded
on a pre-war basis without due consideration to a changing military
situation. It would be impossible to have two administrations in
time of war in adjoining territories, in which our troops were
operating i that is to say, a Rritish administration in Palestine, and
a French administration in Syria, especially as the latter territory
would be nearest our advanced troops. No General would tike to
have foreign administrative officers in charge of u back areas. i he
position in Greece was not analogous, because there we were working