Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎61r] (121/544)

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sentative at Teheran, lie thought that this question must stand over
until the return of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He
himself felt that it was impossible to accept the proposal that Teheran
should be placed under the Government of India. The idea would
be intensely unpopular with the Persians themselves, at the very
moment when we were endeavouring to conciliate their friendship.
In regard to the Government of India’s telegram, he thought that a
reply should be sent to the effect that the Committee had considered
its contents most carefully, but were of opinion that, in the present
circumstances, it was impossible to make the change they suggested.
The existing system had worked fairly well for many years ; to upset
it now because the South Persia Rifles had mutinied or deserted in
one part of Persia would be, to say the least of it, premature.
Lord Robert Cecil said that Marling’s so-called vacillation was
no doubt due to the fact that the situation changed so rapidly. He
himself would be sorry to see Stokes as our representative at Teheran.
Stokes’s recommendation, “ Rely on the Nationalist party,” was
a ntastic. Another policy was to get Vossugh into power, back him
up by force, and then show the country how valuable that backing was.
This was Marling’s policy, but it required military force behind it.
Stokes would have us rule through the Democrats, whereas our
policy, which was one of concession, was to get in Vossugh’s Cabinet.
At first sight he thought there was something to be said for the
suggestion that Sir P. Cox should replace Sir C. Marling; but it was
for the Committee to decide what line they shoidd take in regard to
military and political control. He did not think that it was desirable,
from a broad military point of view, to adopt Mr. Montagu’s
suggestion to build up a second centre of authority. Palestine,
Mesopotamia, and Persia were all parts of a big whole, and he
viewed with something approaching consternation the Secretary of
State for India’s suggestion of having a separate centre in Baghdad
or India. There appeared to be three lines of action: (a) to leave
the control in London ; (b) put the control under the Government of
India; (c) put the military control under the War Office and the
political control under the Indian Government. He agreed, however,
with the Chairman as to the nature of the reply to be sent to India.
General Smuts said that they must watch carefully to see where
was the military centre of gravity in the Middle East. He thought the
situation was developing very quickly and very seriously in North-
West Persia The Committee must take a broad view and not
regard the question as mainly an Indian matter only. If India
refused to take over military control in South and East Persia, the
only alternative appeared to be to put these areas under the War
Office. Briefly, he thought that the political control at Teheran must
remain in this country and not be handed over to India; and that,
as regards military control, the alternative was that the control of
the whole of the areas should rest in the hands of the War Office.
India, however, maintained that political and military control must
go together, and this view was endorsed by the Secretary of State
for India.
Mr. Shuckburgh understood that India’s position was to be that
as they had no voice in the policy at Teheran, they thought it
hardly reasonable that they should be asked to accept responsibility
for military control without any authority to regulate the political
situation. What India wished us to do was to adopt a conciliatory
policy at Teheran, i.e., to work in with the democrats.
The Chairman and Lord Robert Cecil agreed that this, for the
present, was impossible, though it might come later.
Mr. Montagu then read out the following draft reply to the
Indian Government, which was accepted by the Committee :—
“ Viceroy, Foreign Department, dated the 4th July, 1918.
“ (Foreign Secret.)
“ Your telegram of the 1st July : Spheres of control.
“ Our telegram of the 25th ultimo referred only to military
control. His Majesty’s Government do not understand how it
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