Papers of the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee [‎60v] (120/544)

6
Spheres of Military
and Political
Control.
Mr. Montagu said that he was in fall accord with the views of
the Government of India regarding the spheres of control as
expressed in the Viceroy’s telegram of the 1st July (It.0.-694).
This telegram stated that it was assumed that by “ control w T as
meant “ military control ” ; that, if so, “ political control was an
essential corollary; in Bushire, however, local political control
was an impossibility; the Persian political centre was I eheran,
and, in spite of its material weakness, the Persian Government
exercised a surprising authority throughout the country ; the
Indian Government felt, therefore, that so long as they had no
voice in the direction of Teheran policy, they would, in accepting
the spheres of control allotted to them in Persia, be accepting grave
military responsibility without authority to regulate the political
situation within their spheres, or the direction in which our
forces should be used. Mr. Montagu said that when it was decided
by the Committee that the military spheres under the M ar Office
and under the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. were to be North and South Persia
respectively, he had pointed out that political difficulties would
arise. He thought that as a icar vieasure we should have a Charge
d’Affaires at Teheran, appointed by, and working under, the
Government of India and acting in concert with the military
commander. It had been pointed out at the 16th Meeting of the
Committee that the Persian Government distrusted Indian officials
as being bureaucratic and unsympathetic. Colonel Stokes, how
ever, was surely an exception, and he understood him to be both
popular with, and trusted by, the Persians. As he had stated, he
always maintained that military and political control must go
together. To-day, in North Persia, we were facing west in order to
meet the invaders, and in South Persia we were endeavouring
to control unruly tribesmen. The troops for both purposes were
being supplied from India, and the Indian Government naturally
said : “ Why should we give our men and our money to the prosecu
tion of a policy of which we disapprove?” lie attached great
importance to two things, first, to securing a friendly Persian
Government, and second, to making proper provision for the control
of military operations in the enormous war area which was now
being unfolded. He felt strongly on the dangers of over
centralisation ; he did not see how control could properly be
exercised from London, and unless we took steps at once to
decentralise by building up in Baghdad or Teheran, or some
suitable place, a central authority of control, we were in danger of
a breakdown. He would like to see a new military area marked
out to include theatres of war east of the Mediterranean. India had
pressed long ago for a policy of concession vis-a-vis the Persian
Government. He himself believed that our present difficulties in
Persia were due to over-centralisation of political control, and he
was afraid that in later days, when the history of the Committee and
its decisions came to be examined, the Committee might not
emerge from the ordeal with credit.
The Chairman said that the question of our political control in
Persia had been thrashed out by the Welby Commission at great
length some years ago, and, after prolonged discussion, the present
division of functions between the Home and the Indian Govern
ments had been accepted. By “control,” he himself had meant
“ military control,” and he understood this to have been intended
by the Committee. Hitherto “political control” had been centred
at Teheran, which was the pivot of the diplomatic system, and he did
not think it was possible to change this to-day. As regards the
suggestion that Sir P. Cox might control policy in Persia, we had no
means of knowing what policy Cox, if he were placed in that position,
would adopt. Our own policy had been to back \ ossugh, and this
was only said to have failed because we had not sufficient military
force behind it; at least this was Marling’s view. As regards the
suggestion that it might be advisable to replace our political repre-